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With rapid development of hardware devices and software programs, a large
amount of graphic data has been brought to or generated in digital domain, and
become increasingly more widely used in our everyday life. Due to the ease of
editing and distributing graphic data in the digital domain, protecting graphic data
from such fraudulent operations as malicious tampering and unauthorized copying
is becoming a major concern. The primary motivation of this dissertation research
is to develop novel forensic techniques for digital graphic data to facilitate its
proper distribution, authentication, and usage. We investigate two complementary
mechanisms for performing forensic analysis on graphic data, namely, the extrinsic
and intrinsic approaches.
In the extrinsic approaches, we seamlessly embed into graphic data extrinsic
watermarks/fingerprints, which shall later be extracted for verifying authenticity
or tracing leak of the graphic data. By utilizing such extrinsic techniques via data
embedding, we have studied robust digital fingerprinting for curve-based graph-
ics such as topographic maps and drawings, in which a unique ID referred to as a
digital fingerprint is robustly embedded for tracing traitors. Through proper trans-
formations between 2-D contour curves and 3-D digital elevation maps, we have
also developed an effective fingerprinting technique for digital elevation maps. In
order to authenticate such graphic data as critical document and signature images,
we have investigated high-payload watermark embedding for binary images, whose
authenticity shall be decided through verifying integrity of the hidden watermark.
In the intrinsic approaches, since scanners are a major kind of apparatus to
capture graphic data, we develop a new technique of utilizing intrinsic sensor
noise features for non-intrusive scanner forensics to verify the acquisition source
and integrity of digital scanned images. We extract statistical features of scanning
noise from scanned image samples, and construct a robust scanner identifier to
determine the model of the scanner used to capture a scanned image. We further
broaden the scope of acquisition forensics to differentiating scanned images from
camera taken images and computer generated images, as well as perform integrity
forensic analysis on scanned images using the proposed noise features, including
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Graphic data is common in our everyday life. It is often obtained through writ-
ing, drawing, and engraving1. With rapid development of hardware devices and
software programs, a large amount of graphic data has been brought to the digital
domain, and become increasingly more widely used in our everyday life. For ex-
ample, owing to the popularity of scanning devices and pen-based devices, we have
seen a large volume of scanned documents and photos, digitized signatures, and
digital writings and drawings. The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check
21), a U.S. federal law effective in 2004, allows banks to electronically exchange
scanned check images so that transactions can be performed faster and more ef-
ficiently than physically transporting paper checks [1]. With the advancement of
software, a lot of graphic data is also directly generated from various computer pro-
grams, such as vector/raster maps from map-making software, engineering graphs
from computer-aided design (CAD) systems, cartoons from cartoon/2-D anima-
1http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/graphical
1
tion software. In this dissertation, we target at various graphic data and develop
novel forensic techniques to facilitate its proper distribution and authentication.
With the wide availability and usage of a large amount of graphic data, it is
of utmost importance to protect it from various fraudulent operations. Different
kinds of graphic data in various applications raise different requirements on their
protection. Such graphic data as military maps contain information with high
sensitivity, and therefore prompt the need for preventing information leak and
tracing the source of leak. Civilian maps as well as CAD drawing and cartoons
often have high commercial values, and the protection from unauthorized copying
and illegal re-distribution is highly desirable. Such graphic data as digitized sig-
natures and scanned checks/photos provides evidence in financial systems and/or
law enforcement, and therefore it becomes particularly important to establish-
ing its authenticity and/or identifying its acquisition source. Meanwhile, digital
graphic data can be easily edited by computer programs, and distributed through
computer networks. For example, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) de-
veloped a standard known as Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) [2] to facilitate the
transmission and sharing of graphic data. The ease of editing and dissemination of
graphic data makes the developing of digital forensic techniques more urgent and
important.
1.2 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Approaches
In this section, we describe several techniques related to the emerging field of
digital forensic research. We focus on two complementary mechanisms that can
be utilized for performing forensic analysis on graphic data, namely, the extrinsic
approaches via data embedding and the intrinsic detection via inherent sensor
2
features.
Extrinsic techniques via data embedding are promising building blocks to con-
struct digital forensic systems for graphic data. Through embedding extrinsic
watermarks/fingerprints seamlessly into the graphic data, we can protect different
kinds of graphic data in an application-dependent way. For example, to protect
graphic data with sensitive information and/or high commercial values (such as
maps and drawing) from being leaked or illegally re-distributed, we can embed a
unique ID referred to as a digital fingerprint into each copy of the graphic data to
represent the recipient’s identity [19, 92]. When a suspicious copy of the graphic
data appears, the fingerprint embedded before can then be extracted for tracing
the source of leak. The extrinsic data embedding technique can also be employed
to verify the authenticity of such graphic data as digitized signatures and critical
scanned documents (such as scanned checks). A pre-determined pattern or some
content feature is taken as a digital watermark and then seamlessly embedded into
the host graphic data. When the watermarked graphic data is tampered, the in-
tegrity of its hidden data shall be violated correspondingly, providing the evidence
of tampering [88,95].
Complementary to the extrinsic technique via data embedding, some recent
research on digital forensics are utilizing intrinsic sensor features which are di-
rectly associated with the acquisition device of the host data. While extrinsic
approaches require some hidden data be inserted into the host data beforehand for
future forensic analysis, the intrinsic approaches aim at detecting inherent sensor
features non-intrusively by using only host data samples. One example is the com-
ponent forensic methodology introduced in [81], where some parameters obtained
from camera modelling, such as the color filter array (CFA) pattern and the CFA
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interpolation coefficients, are used to determine the brand/model of the camera
used to capture a photographic image. This camera identifier has been further
used to detect multi-segment image splicing by assuming that different segments
in a doctored image come from different camera models [80]. It has been also
employed to identify post-processing operations on a direct camera output by ver-
ifying if a test image violates the conditions imposed by camera modelling [82].
Such non-intrusive method of detecting and leveraging intrinsic sensor features is
also beneficial for forensic analysis on such graphic data as scanned images. Cer-
tain sensor features unique to scanners shall be identified, and then used to verify
the source and integrity of scanned images.
1.3 Thesis Organization and Contribution
This dissertation focuses on studying novel forensic techniques for several impor-
tant types of graphic data. We investigate the two complementary mechanisms
described in Section 1.2, constructing data-embedding based forensic systems for
curve-based graphic data, digital elevation maps(DEMs), and binary graphic data,
as well as identifying intrinsic sensor features of scanners for verifying the source
and integrity of scanned images. The main challenge in forensic analysis on vari-
ous graphic data is to identify the characteristics unique to each type of graphic
data, and then to develop the extrinsic data embedding algorithms or the intrinsic
sensor features in a way of tailoring to those unique characteristics.
This dissertation is organized as follows. The first part consists of Chapter 2
to Chapter 4 and focuses on developing extrinsic data embedding algorithms for
various graphic data for tracing information leak or verifying data authenticity.
Specifically, Chapter 2 studies a robust data embedding method for curves and
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investigates its feasibility for digital fingerprinting of such curve-based graphic
data as topographic maps and writhings/drawings for traitor tracing. Leveraging
a curve modeling method, the B-splines, we achieve high-fidelity curve embedding
as well as effective fingerprint detection with strong robustness against a number
of challenging attacks. Based on the work presented in Chapter 2, Chapter 3
extends the robust digital fingerprinting of 2-D curves to 3-D digital elevation
maps (DEMs), through proper transformations between a 3-D DEM and its 2-
D contours. The proposed method enables reliable cross-dimensional fingerprint
detection from both the 3-D DEM data set and its 2-D rendering, whichever format
that is available to a detector. In Chapter 4, we study the problem of high-payload
data embedding for binary images to facilitate the authentication of such graphic
data as critical document and signature images. Incorporating a recently proposed
steganography approach known as “wet paper coding”, we naturally handle the
uneven embedding capacity issue in binary graphic data and greatly increase the
embedding payload. To maintain good perceptual quality of watermarked binary
images under a high embedding payload, we further develop an adaptive trimming
method and also introduce a new concept of super-pixels to address the pixel
flippability issue unique to binary graphic data.
The second part of this dissertation uses scanners as examples to discuss the
intrinsic technique via sensor features. We explore in Chapter 5 a novel tech-
nique of detecting inherent scanner features to establish the trust-worthiness of
scanning devices and scanned images. We extract from scanned image samples in-
formative scanner noise features, building upon which we first construct a robust
scanner identifier to determine the model of the scanner used to capture individ-
ual scanned images. We further broaden the scope of acquisition source forensics
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to differentiating scanned images from camera taken images and computer gener-
ated images. Leveraging the intrinsic scanner noise features, we finally perform
integrity forensic analysis on scanned images, including detecting post-processing
operations after scanning and implementing steganalysis on scanned images.




Robust Digital Fingerprinting of
Curves for Traitor Tracing
In this chapter, we present a new, robust data hiding technique for curves and in-
vestigate its feasibility for fingerprinting curve-based graphic data, such as maps,
without interfering with its meaningful content. We parameterize a curve using the
B-spline model, select B-spline control points of the curve as the feature domain,
and add spread spectrum sequences as digital fingerprints to the coordinates of the
B-spline control points. A proper set of B-spline control points forms a compact
collection of salient features representing the shape of the curve, which is anal-
ogous to the perceptually significant components in continuous-tone images [20].
The shape of curves is also invariant to such challenging attacks as printing-and-
scanning and format conversions. The additive spread spectrum embedding and
the corresponding correlation-based detection generally provide a good tradeoff be-
tween imperceptibility and robustness [20], especially when the original host signal
is available to the detector, as in most of the digital fingerprinting applications [92].
To determine which fingerprint sequence(s) is(are) present in a test curve, its
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registration with the original unmarked curve is an indispensable preprocessing
step. B-splines have invariance to affine transformations in that the affine trans-
formation of a curve is equivalent to applying the same affine transformation to
its B-spline control points. This affine invariance property of B-splines can facil-
itate automatic curve registration. Meanwhile, as a curve can be approximated
by different sets of B-spline control points, we propose an iterative alignment-
minimization (IAM) algorithm to simultaneously align the curves and identify the
corresponding B-spline control points with high precision. Through the B-spline
based data hiding as well as the IAM algorithm for robust fingerprint detection,
the proposed data embedding technique can sustain a number of challenging at-
tacks on marked curves, such as collusion, cropping, geometric transformations,
vector/raster-raster/vector conversions, and printing-and-scanning, and is there-
fore capable of building an effective fingerprinting system for maps and other curve-
based graphic data.
2.1 Introduction
Maps are graphic data representing geospatial information ubiquitous in govern-
ment, military, intelligence, and commercial operations. The traditional way to
protect a map from unauthorized copying and distribution is to place deliberate
errors in the map as the trademark, such as spelling “Nelson Road” as “Nelsen
Road”, bending a road in a wrong way, and/or placing a non-existing pond. If
an unauthorized user has a map containing basically the same set of errors, this
is a strong piece of evidence for piracy that can be presented in court. One of
the classic lawsuits is the Rockford Map Pub. vs. Dir. Service Co. of Colorado,
768 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir., 1985), where phony middle initials of names in a map
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spelled out “Rockford Map Inc.” when read from the top of the map to the bottom,
and thus copyright infringement was found. However, such traditional protection
methods alter the geospatial meanings conveyed by a map, which can cause serious
problems in critical government, military, intelligence, and commercial operations
that require high-fidelity geospatial information. Furthermore, in the situations
where distinct errors serve as fingerprints to trace individual copies, the deliber-
ately placed errors can be easily identified and removed in the digital domain by
comparing several map copies with different errors placed in. To overcome all these
limitations of the traditional methods, it is desirable to develop some modern ways
that can be more effective and less intrusive.
Curves are one of the major components appearing in maps and also in some
other graphic data such as writings and drawings. Owing to the popularity of
scanning devices and pen-based devices (such as Tablet PCs), a huge amount of
curve-based graphic data are being brought to the digital domain. Digital maps
and drawings are also generated directly by various computer programs, such as
map-making software and computer-aided design systems. Many of these curve-
based graphic data, such as maps and CAD drawings, contain information with
high sensitivity and/or high commercial values, and therefore prompt the need of
preventing information leak in military or unauthorized copying and re-distribution
in commerce. Data embedding techniques are promising building blocks to con-
struct digital forensics systems that can protect curve-based graphic data from
illegal re-distribution. Before distributing each copy of the graphic data, the au-
thority embeds into it a unique digital fingerprint to represent the recipient’s iden-
tity. When some recipients leak their copies and these leaked copies are acquired
by the authority, the sources of the leak can be identified by examining what IDs
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are contained in the suspicious copies.
To be an effective forensic mechanism for tracing the leak source, digital fin-
gerprints must be difficult to remove. This requires the data embedded in curves
be robust against common processing and malicious attacks. One example is col-
lusion, where several users combine information from several copies of the pro-
tected graphic data, each having the same content but a different fingerprint,
so as to generate a new copy in which the original fingerprints are removed or
attenuated [92]. Some other distortions/attacks include various geometric trans-
formations such as rotation, scaling, and translation (RST), raster/vector format
conversion, and D/A-A/D conversions such as printing-and-scanning. At the same
time, the fingerprint should be embedded in a non-intrusive way to preserve the
information to be conveyed with high precision. This is because intrusive changes
may have serious consequences in critical military and commercial operations, for
example, when inaccurate data is given to troops or fed into navigation systems.
There are a very limited amount of existing works on data embedding for maps
and graphic data [12], and few works exploit curve features or address fingerprint-
ing issues. As for map watermarking, a text-based geometric normalization method
was proposed in [7], whereby text labels are first used to normalize the orientation
and scale of the map image, and conventional robust watermarking algorithms for
grayscale images are then applied. Since curve-based graphic data can be repre-
sented as a binary bitmap image (known as the raster representation) or a set of
vectors (known as the vector representation), we review the related prior art from
these two aspects accordingly. As for data embedding in general binary images,
most of the existing works [52,66,71,90,91] are intended for the purpose of tamper
detection. The fragility of these embedding techniques and the dependence on pre-
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cise sampling of pixels for correct decoding pose challenges in surviving geometric
transformations, printing-and-scanning, and malicious removal in fingerprinting
applications. A few other works embed information in dithered images by manip-
ulating the dithering patterns, in fax images by manipulating the run-length [64],
and in formatted textual images by changing the line spacing and character spac-
ing [65]. However, these works cannot be easily extended to curve-based graphic
data. As for data embedding in vector graphics, two related works perturb ver-
tices through Fourier descriptors of polygonal lines [76] or spectral analysis of mesh
models [70] to embed copyright marks. However, the embedding in [76] introduces
visible distortions. The approach in [70] has high complexity resulting from the
mesh spectral analysis, and it cannot be easily applied to maps beyond urban ar-
eas, where curves become essential components in mapping a vast amount of land
and underwater terrains.
Several data embedding algorithms on graphic data explore compact represen-
tation of curves or surfaces, such as through the non-uniform rational B-spline
(NURBS) model. The work in [69] concerns how to embed data in NURBS curves
and surfaces without changing the shape or increasing the number of B-spline pa-
rameters. The approach demonstrated in [69] relies on reparameterizing a curve or
surface using a rational linear function that has an offset determined by the bits to
be embedded. The embedded data is fragile and can be removed by perturbing the
NURBS parameters or another round of reparameterization. The work in [55, 56]
focuses on 3-D surfaces and extracts NURBS features from a 3-D surface to form
a few 2-D arrays. Through DCT-domain embedding in these virtual images, a
watermark is embedded into the 3-D NURBS surfaces. The work in [74] employs
a different domain for 3-D surfaces through multiresolution mesh modelling and
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embeds a spread spectrum watermark by perturbing the mesh vertices along the
direction of the surface normal. Registration techniques for 3-D NURBS surfaces,
such as [51], may be employed to facilitate the alignment of the test surfaces with
the original reference surface prior to watermark detection. These prior works
provide enlightening analogies for watermarking 2-D curves in the B-spline fea-
ture domain. However, as most existing exploration either has limited robustness
or targets mainly 3-D surfaces, there are few discussions on robust fingerprinting
of curves. To our best knowledge, no existing data embedding work has demon-
strated the robustness against curve format conversions and D/A-A/D conversions,
or addressed collusion resistance and traitor tracing issues for curves.
In the remaining of this chapter, we present our robust data embedding tech-
nique for curves by identifying and manipulating curve parameters based on the B-
spline model [36–38]. Section 2.2 discusses the feature domain of B-spline control
points, and presents the basic embedding and detection algorithms with experi-
mental results on marking simple curves. To achieve robust fingerprint detection,
Section 2.3 develops an iterative alignment-minimization algorithm to perform
curve registration and to address non-uniqueness of B-spline control points simul-
taneously. Experimental results on fingerprinting topographic maps are presented
in Section 2.4 to demonstrate the robustness of our method against a number of
distortions and attacks. Finally we summarize this chapter in Section 2.5.
2.2 Basic Embedding and Detection
Our proposed algorithm employs B-spline control points of curves as the feature
domain, and adopts spread spectrum embedding [20] for robustly watermarking the
coordinates of the control points. The fingerprints for different users are approxi-
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mately orthogonal and are generated by a pseudo-random number generator with
different keys, and the detection is based on correlation statistics. In the following
subsections, we explain the main issues of the basic embedding and detection in
detail.
2.2.1 Feature Extraction
A number of approaches have been proposed for curve modelling, including us-
ing chain codes, Fourier descriptors, autoregressive models, and B-splines [46].
Among them, B-splines are particularly attractive and have been extensively used
in computer-aided design and computer graphics. This is mainly because the B-
spline model provides a continuous approximation of a curve with excellent local
shape control and is invariant to affine transformations [25]. These advantages also
lead to our choosing B-splines as the feature domain for embedding data in curves.
B-splines are piecewise polynomial functions that provide local approximations
of curves using a small number of parameters known as the control points [46]. Let
{p(t)} denote a curve, where p(t) = (px(t), py(t)) and t is a continuous indexing





where t ranges from 0 to n−1, ci = (cxi , cyi) is the ith control point (i = 0, 1, . . . , n),
and Bi,k(t) is the weight of the i
th control point for the point p[B](t) and known as









ti+k−1 − ti +
(ti+k − t)Bi+1,k−1(t)
ti+k − ti+1 , k = 2, 3, ..., (2.2)
where {ti} are parameters known as knots and represent locations where the B-
spline functions are tied together [46]. The placement of knots controls the form
of B-spline functions and in turn the control points.
As a compact representation, the number of B-spline control points necessary
to represent a curve at a desired precision can be much smaller than the number
of points that can be sampled from the curve. Thus, given a set of samples on
the curve, finding a smaller set of control points for its B-spline approximation
that minimizes the approximation error to the original curve can be formulated as
a least-squares problem. Coordinates of the m + 1 samples on the curve can be



















 (px,py) . (2.3)
The indexing values of the B-spline blending functions corresponding to these m+1
samples are t = s0, s1, s2, . . . , sm, where s0 < s1 < s2 < · · · < sm. Further, let C



















 (cx, cy) . (2.4)
Then we can write the least-squares problem with its solution as
min
C
‖BC − P‖2 =⇒ C = (BTB)−1BTP = B†P, (2.5)
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where {B}ji is the value of the kth-order B-spline blending function Bi,k(t) in (2.2)
evaluated at t = sj for the i
th control point and † denotes the pseudo inverse of
a matrix. Because of the natural decoupling of the x and y coordinates in the
B-spline representation, we can solve the problem separately along each of the two
coordinates as⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
mincx ‖Bcx − px‖2









2.2.2 Embedding and Detection in Control-Point Domain
Control points of a curve are analogous to perceptually significant components of
a continuous-tone image [20] in that they form a compact set of salient features
for curves. In such a feature domain, we apply spread spectrum embedding and
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Figure 2.1: The basic embedding and detection process of data hiding in curves.
In the embedding, we use mutually independent, noise-like sequences as digital
fingerprints to represent different users/IDs for trace and track purposes. As each
of the n + 1 control points has two coordinate values x and y, the overall length
of the fingerprint sequence is 2(n + 1). To apply spread spectrum embedding
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on a curve, we add a scaled version of the fingerprint sequence (wx,wy) to the
coordinates of a set of control points obtained from the previous subsection. This








c′x = cx + αwx
c′y = cy + αwy
, (2.7)
where α is a scaling factor adjusting the fingerprint strength. A watermarked curve
can then be constructed according to the B-spline synthesis equation (2.1) using
these watermarked control points.
To determine which fingerprint sequence(s) is(are) present in a test curve, we
first need to perform registration using as a reference the original unmarked curve
that is commonly available to a detector in fingerprinting applications. After
registration, control points (c̃x, c̃y) are extracted from the test curve. The accurate
registration and correct extraction of control points are crucial to the detection of
fingerprints, which will be detailed in Section 2.3. Assuming we have the set of
sample points given by (p̃x, p̃y)=(B(cx + αwx),B(cy+αwy)), we can extract the
test control points (c̃x, c̃y) from (p̃x, p̃y) using (2.6). After getting (c̃x, c̃y), we
compute the difference between the coordinates of the test and the original control










The estimated fingerprint sequence consists of one or several users’ contribu-
tions as well as some noise coming from distortions or attacks. The problem of
finding out which user(s) has(have) contributed to the estimated fingerprint can
be formulated as hypothesis testing [85], which is commonly handled by evaluat-
ing the similarity between the estimated fingerprint sequence and each fingerprint
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sequence in the database through a correlation-based statistic. Various correlation-
based statistics share a kernel term that measures the total correlation , and differ
in how they are normalized. To facilitate the evaluation of detection performance,
we often normalize the detection statistic to make it have a unit variance and follow
approximately a Gaussian distribution under distortions and attacks. There are
several ways to do so [97], for example, to normalize using the product of the noise’s
standard deviation and the watermark’s L2 norm, or through a logarithm-based
transformation to be introduced next.
2.2.3 Z statistic for Detection
A nonlinear function of the sample correlation coefficient from the mathematical
statistics literature [10] was introduced to the watermarking community by Stone
and colleagues of the NEC Research Institute [78]. This is often referred to as the
Fisher’s Z statistic. Among several correlation-based statistics analyzed and com-
pared in [97], the Z statistic shows excellent robustness against different collusion
attacks and does not require the explicit estimation of the noise’s variance. These
advantages make it attractive to handle our problem.
The Z statistic originated from the statistical problem of sampling a bivariate
normal population [10], i.e. to obtain i.i.d. samples from a pair of random variables
that are jointly Gaussian distributed, with correlation coefficient ρ unknown to the
observers. Let r be the sample correlation coefficient computed from L pairs of






has been shown [10] to asymptotically follow a normal distribution when L → ∞,
with the mean approximating 1
2
log 1+ρ
1−ρ and the variance approximating 1/(L − 3).
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1 − ρ, 1
)
. (2.9)
The approximation is found excellent with as few as 10 pairs of samples.
In our fingerprint detection problem in the control-point domain, the effective
number of samples for computing the statistic is L = 2(n+1). Denoting the average
values of the components in w̃ and w as μ̃ and μ, respectively, we compute the
sample correlation coefficient r between w̃ and w by
r =
∑L
i=1(w̃i − μ̃)(wi − μ)√∑L
j=1 (w̃j − μ̃)2
∑L
k=1 (wk − μ)2
. (2.10)
A simplified model considers that the corresponding components of an extracted
fingerprint in question and a particular user Alice’s fingerprint are i.i.d. samples
from a bivariate normal population. When the extracted fingerprint does not have
Alice’s contribution, the expected correlation coefficient is zero, and the Z statistic
will approximately follow a Gaussian distribution with a zero mean and a unit
variance. When the fingerprint has Alice’s contribution, the Z statistic will have
a large positive mean determined by the correlation coefficient ρ. To derive the
expression for ρ, we define a random variable Y  W + N and the extracted
fingerprint consists of i.i.d. samples from Y . Here, W is a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable representing Alice’s fingerprint, and N is a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable representing noise. The correlation coefficient of this bivariate
normal population (W,Y ) is
ρ =
cov(W,Y )√
V ar(W )V ar(Y )
=
V ar(W ) + cov(W,N)√
V ar(W ) [V ar(W ) + V ar(N) + 2cov(W,N)]
. (2.11)












where the watermark-to-noise ratio WNR  V ar(W )
V ar(N)
. In Figure 2.2(a), we plot the
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(b) (c)
Figure 2.2: Z statistics and ROC curves: (a) Mean of Z statistics for different
WNR and L; (b) ROC curves for different L at WNR = 0 dB; (c) ROC curves for
different WNR at L = 700.
Now knowing the distribution of the Z statistic under the presence and absence
of Alice’s fingerprint, we can compute the probabilities of detection Pd and false
alarm Pfa for different decision thresholds. A threshold of 3 gives a false alarm
probability on the order of 10−3, while a threshold of 6 corresponds to the order
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of 10−9. The tradeoff between Pd and Pfa can be visualized in terms of Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, as shown in Figure 2.2(b) for different L
at a fixed WNR and Figure 2.2(c) for different WNR at a fixed L.
In reality, as the noise introduced by attacks does not necessarily follow a
Gaussian distribution and/or the noise samples may be mutually correlated, the
Z statistics with true traitors may be different from the unit-variance Gaussian
distribution. The actual distributions of the Z statistics for the fingerprint pres-
ence/absence cases and the detection performance in terms of the detection proba-
bility and the false alarm probability will be presented in our experimental results.
2.2.4 Fidelity and Robustness Considerations
Fingerprint Construction: The collusion resistance requirement makes the fin-
gerprinting problem more challenging than robustly embedding a meaningful ID
label, as the simple encoding of IDs can be vulnerable to collusion (e.g., different
users average their copies of the same content to remove the IDs). Designing a
collusion-resistant code is one of the possible approaches and has been studied
in [83]. Such a coded approach requires that each code symbol be reliably embed-
ded, which consumes a non-trivial amount of markable features per embedded bit.
The markable feature for our curve watermarking problem is the coordinates of
control points. As the number of control points is limited and the changes have to
be small, orthogonal modulation that uses (approximately) orthogonal signals to
represent different users is more attractive than the coded modulation [89]. The
general collusion resistance of orthogonal fingerprinting has been studied in [85],
which shows the maximum number of colluders that the system can resist is a
function of the watermark-to-noise ratio, the number of markable features, the
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total number of users, as well as the false positive and negative requirements.
While the orthogonal design of fingerprints is conceptually simple and easy
to analyze, the practical implementation often employs a pseudo-random number
generator to produce a sequence of independent random numbers as a fingerprint
and uses different seeds for different users [50, 83, 97]. In this way, the actual
fingerprints would be statistically uncorrelated, but they can have a non-zero cor-
relation. This correlation can accommodate a larger number of fingerprint vectors
than the vector’s dimension, but it also affects the detection performance to some
degree. Since the correlation is very low between the independent fingerprints, the
impact is small. This can be seen from our experimental results of the detection
performance in Section 2.2.5 and Section 2.4.
Curvature-based Sampling: The overall distortion introduced by the embed-
ding process on a curve consists of two parts: one is from the watermark signals
added to the control point coordinates, and the other is from the B-spline mod-
elling. To make the B-spline synthesized curve as close to the original curve as
possible and thus keep the modelling error low, the knots connecting adjacent
segments of B-splines should be wisely placed, and the sample points should be
properly chosen to feed into the least-squares estimator for the control points. Uni-
form sampling can be used when there are no abrupt changes in a curve segment,
while nonuniform sampling is desirable for curve segments that exhibit substantial
variations in curvature.
Inspired by [11,45], we employ a curvature-based method to select sample points
from raster curves. Formally, the curvature [21] of a point p(t) = (px(t), py(t)) on



















, and p′′y =
d2py
dt2
. In practical implementations,
we approximate the curvature of each point on the curve by measuring the angular
change in the tangent line at its location. Specifically, we perform a 1st-order
polynomial curve fitting on an l-pixel interval before and after the curve point
p(t) to get two slopes, k1 and k2. The approximate curvature k̂(t) is computed
by k̂(t) = |arctan(k1) − arctan(k2)|. Based on k̂(t), we select more sample points
from higher-curvature segments and fewer from lower-curvature segments.
After selecting m + 1 sample points and put them together into (px,py) as de-
fined in Equation (2.3), we need to determine their indexing values t = s0, s1, s2, . . . ,
sm, which will be used to evaluate their B-spline blending function values Bi,k(t).
In our tests, we employ the uniform non-periodic B-spline blending function of
order k = 3, and the knot parameters {ti} are determined as [t0, t1, ..., tn+3] =
[0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., n − 2, n − 1, n − 1, n − 1]. One way of the indexing-value assign-
ment is known as the chord-length method [16], which increases t values of the
sample points in proportion to the chord length
sj = sj−1 + ‖pj − pj−1‖ n − 1∑m
i=1 ‖pi − pi−1‖
, j = 1, 2, ...m, (2.14)
where s0 = 0 and ‖pj − pj−1‖ denotes the chord length between points pj and
pj−1.
In the case of vector curves, we are generally given a set of discrete, non-
uniformly spaced points for each curve. Since a vector curve can be rendered as a
raster curve by interpolation, we can determine its sample points and their corre-
sponding indexing values by rendering it to be a raster curve and then performing
the curvature-based sampling and the chord-length method as described above. A
simpler alternative is to directly use the given discrete points as sample points but
assign their indexing values according to a curvature-based rule. Specifically, we
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approximate the curvature of each sample point (px(sj), py(sj)) by
k̂(sj) =




and then increase t values of the sample points in inverse proportion to their cur-
vature. The higher the curvature, the smaller the increase in the t value. This
is equivalent to having more control points for higher-curvature segments. With
more “resources” in terms of B-spline control points assigned to segments with
more details (i.e., higher-curvature segments), it allows for a better B-spline ap-
proximation.
Determining the Fingerprint Length and Strength: The number of control
points is an important parameter for tuning. Depending on the shape of the curve,
using too few control points could cause the details of the curve to be lost, while
using too many control points may lead to over-fitting and bring artifacts even
before data embedding. One simple method of determining the number of control
points is to compute the approximate curvature of each sample point as in (2.15)
and assign higher weights to points with higher curvature. We then determine the
number of control points according to the total weights of all sample points on the
curve. The number of control points not only affects the distortion introduced by
the embedding, but also determines the fingerprint’s robustness against noise and
attacks. The more the control points there are, the longer the fingerprint sequence
is, and in turn the more robust the fingerprint is against noise and attacks. Too
many control points, however, may lead to over-fitting and incur visible distortions
even before data embedding. In our tests, the number of control points is about
5-8% of the total number of curve pixels.
The scaling factor α also affects the invisibility and robustness of fingerprints.
The larger the scaling factor is, the more robust the fingerprint is, but it results
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in a larger distortion. For cartographic applications, industrial standards provide
guidelines on the maximum allowable changes. Perturbation of 2 to 3 pixels is
usually considered acceptable. We use random number sequences with a unit
variance as fingerprints and set α to 0.5 in our tests. The difference between two
curves can be quantified using such max-min metrics as the Hausdorff distance [9].
More specifically, let d(a, b) be the distance between two points a and b, which are
on two curves, A and B, respectively. We further define the distance from point a
to curve B as d(a,B)  infb∈B d(a, b), and the distance from curve A to curve B
as dB(A)  supa∈A d(a,B). Thus, the Hausdorff distance between curve A and B
is
h(A,B)  dB(A) + dA(B) (2.16)
Nonblind Detection: The basic fingerprint detection presented earlier makes use
of the original unmarked copy and is known as nonblind detection. While blind
detection is preferred for a few major data hiding applications (such as ownership
verification, authentication, and annotation), non-blind detection is considered as
a reasonable assumption for many fingerprinting applications [19, 58, 83], which
is also the focus of this and the following chapter. The rationale for nonblind
detection is that the fingerprint verification is usually handled by the content owner
or by an authorized central server, who can have access to the original host signal
and use it in the detection to answer the primary question of whose fingerprint
is in the suspicious document. The availability of the original unmarked copy
in the detection gives a high equivalent watermark-to-noise ratio, thus allowing
for high resistance against noise and attacks. Additionally, using the original
unmarked copy as a reference copy, the detector can register a test copy that
suffers from geometric distortions, which enables the resilience to various geometric
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transformations as to be demonstrated later in this chapter.
2.2.5 Experimental Results of Fingerprinting Simple Curves
To demonstrate our basic embedding and detection algorithms, we first present the
fingerprinting results on two simple curves, the “Swan” curve in Fig. 2.3(a) and the
“W” curve in Fig. 2.4(a). These two curves were hand-drawn on a Tablet PC and
stored as binary images of size 329×392 and 521×288, respectively. We use the
contour following algorithm in [11] to traverse the curve and obtain a set of ordered
curve points. When fingerprinting these two curves, we perform uniform sampling
on the curve points and determine the indexing values of the sample points using
the chord-length method. We highlight the control points of the “Swan” curve in
Fig. 2.3(c). The fingerprinted curves are shown in Fig. 2.3(b) and Fig. 2.4(b),
where we have marked 101 control points for each curve. With the marked control
points, we construct the fingerprinted curve with the same number of points as
the original curve by evaluating the B-spline synthesis formula (2.1) at indexing
values uniformly sampled between t = 0 and t = n − 1. As for the fidelity of
the fingerprinted curves, the Hausdorff distance between the original and marked
curves is 5.0 for the “Swan” curve, and 3.4 for the “W” curve. The differences are
hardly visible to human eyes.
In the detection, we take a fingerprinted curve constructed above as a test
curve and apply uniform sampling to it to obtain an approximation of the set of
sample points (p̃x, p̃y)=(B(cx +αwx),B(cy+αwy)) assumed in Section 2.2.2. We
then estimate the test control points and perform the correlation-based detection.
The detection results on the fingerprinted “W” curve are shown in Fig. 2.4(c),
which illustrates a high Z value for the correct positive detection with the 1000th
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sequence corresponding to the true user, and very small Z statistics for the correct
negative detection with other sequences of the innocent users. To quantify the
detection performance, we generate 1000 different sets of fingerprint sequences, and
each set consists of 1000 independent fingerprint sequences that are approximately
orthogonal to each other. For each set, we embed each of the 1000 fingerprint
sequences into the original curve to form a fingerprinted curve, and then estimate
a fingerprint sequence from the fingerprinted curve and compute the Z values with
the 1000 fingerprint sequences. In this way, we collect a total of 1000 × 1000 =
1 × 106 values for the fingerprint presence case and 1000 × 1000 × 999 ≈ 1 × 109
values for the fingerprint absence case. Using these data, we plot in Fig. 2.5 the
histogram of the Z values for both fingerprint presence and absence cases. For each
of these two sets of data, we calculate its mean and variance, and then plot the
Gaussian distribution with the calculated mean and variance. As shown by the
dashed curves in Fig. 2.5, the two Gaussian approximations, N (11.22, 0.87) and
N (−0.0009, 1.00), fit the observed Z values very well. We can see that we indeed
get an approximate Gaussian distribution with a large positive mean under the
presence of a fingerprint and a zero mean under the absence.
We further examine the measured and the Gaussian approximated probabil-
ities of detection and false alarm for different thresholds on the Z statistic. We
see from the results in Table 2.1 that the Gaussian approximation works well in
regions close to the mean, while the measured values slightly deviate from the
Gaussian approximation in regions farther from the mean. At the same time, we
note that in the tail regions where the Gaussian approximation becomes loose, the
approximated order of magnitude matches very well with the measured value from
our experiments. The miss probability or false alarm probability in the tail regions
26
Table 2.1: Measured detection performance and its Gaussian approximation for
the “W” curve.
Threshold on Z 3 4.5 6 7.5 9 
Measured 0 0 0 4.1 10-5 8.7 10-3
1-Pd Gaussian approx. 6.6 10-19 3.1 10-13 1.1 10-8 3.4 10-5 8.7 10-3
Measured 1.4 10-3 4.1 10-6 2.0 10-9 0 0 
Pfa Gaussian approx. 1.3 10-3 3.4 10-6 0.97 10-9 3.1 10-14 1.1 10-19
is already very small (below 10−5). Therefore, for many practical applications,
either the probability may be deemed as zero, or an approximation on the order of
magnitude would be sufficient. The table also shows that a threshold of 6 on the
detection statistics gives a false alarm probability of 10−9, which is sufficiently low
for most applications. Thus, we choose 6 as the detection threshold in our tests.
The detection result for the “Swan” curve is similar and will not be repeated here.











Figure 2.3: Fingerprinting a hand-drawn “Swan” curve: (a) original curve; (b)
fingerprinted curve; (c) control points overlaid on the original curve.
Furthermore, we examine the survivability of the fingerprints by using our
basic scheme, which employs the coordinates of the B-spline control points as the
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Figure 2.4: Fingerprinting a hand-drawn “W” curve: (a) original curve; (b) fin-
gerprinted curve; (c) detection statistics.
embedding domain, and uses approximately orthogonal spread spectrum signals
as fingerprints. We perform a printing-and-scanning test with manual registration
between the scanned fingerprinted curve and the original unmarked curve. We print
out the fingerprinted “W” curve using a HP laser printer, and scan it back as a
527×288 binary image as shown in Fig. 2.6(a). In addition to manual registration,
a thinning operation is performed to extract a one-pixel wide skeleton from the
scanned curve that is usually several pixels’ wide after high-resolution scanning.
As we can see from the detection results in Fig. 2.6(b), despite the curve being
simple and the number of control points being relatively small, the fingerprint
survives the printing-and-scanning process and gives a detection statistic higher
than the detection threshold. The issue of automating the registration process will
be addressed in the next section.
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Figure 2.5: Histogram and Gaussian approximation of the Z statistics for the “W”
curve.
2.3 Iterative Alignment-Minimization Algorithm
for Robust Fingerprint Detection
The set of test sample points (p̃x, p̃y) assumed in Section 2.2.2 is not always avail-
able to a detector, especially when a test curve undergoes vector-raster conversion,
geometric transformations (such as rotation, translation, and scaling), and/or is
scanned from a printed hard copy. A pre-processing step preceding the basic fin-
gerprint detection module is needed to align the test curve with the original one.
While manual registration between the test curve and the original unmarked curve
shown in Section 2.2.5 is a possible way to overcome simple geometric distortions,
automated registration is more desirable to improve the accuracy and efficiency of
this indispensable pre-processing step. Note that the test curve should be regis-
tered with the original unmarked curve, and any “clean/undistorted” fingerprinted
copies known to the detector should not be used as a reference for registering the
test curve. This is not only because which fingerprints are present in the test curve
still remains to be determined, but also because using a fingerprinted copy as a
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Figure 2.6: Printing-and-scanning test for the “W” curve: (a) fingerprinted curve
after printing-and-scanning; (b) detection statistics.
reference for registration may increase the false alarm probability in determining
the presence or absence of the corresponding fingerprint.
With the affine invariance property, B-splines have been used in a few existing
curve alignment works. In the moment-based approach of [45], two affine-related
curves are fitted by two separate B-splines, and the transform parameters are
estimated by using weighted B-spline curve moments. This method requires taking
integration as well as the second-order curve derivatives to obtain the moments.
In a recent method employing a super-curve [93], two affine-related curves are
superimposed together in the same frame, and then this combined super-curve is
fitted by a single B-spline. Through minimizing the B-spline fitting error, both
transform parameters and control points of the fitting B-spline can be estimated
simultaneously. Since neither integration nor differentiation is needed, this method
is robust to noise and will serve as a building block in our work.
Another problem related to the test sample points assumed earlier is the in-
herent non-uniqueness of B-spline control points, which refers to the fact that a
curve can be effectively approximated by different sets of B-spline control points.
We have seen from Section 2.2.1 that B-spline control points are estimated from
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a set of sample points from the curve. With a different set of sample points or a
different indexing-value assignment, we may induce a quite different set of control
points that can still well describe the same curve. It is possible for the difference
between two sets of unmarked control points to be much larger than the embedded
fingerprint sequence, as demonstrated by the example in Fig. 2.7. Therefore, if
we cannot find from a test curve a set of control points corresponding to the one
used in the embedding, we may not be able to detect the fingerprint sequence.
Considering the one-to-one relationship between sample points (including their in-
dexing values {sj}) and control points, we try to find the set of sample points from
a test curve that corresponds to the set of sample points used in the embedding.
We shall refer to this problem as the point correspondence problem. As we shall
see, the non-uniqueness issue of B-spline control points can be addressed through
finding the point correspondence.
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Unmarked control point set I
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.7: Non-uniqueness of B-spline control points: (a) a set of control points
for the original unmarked curve and its fingerprinted version; (b) two different sets
of control points for modelling the same unmarked curve.
In the following subsections, we first formulate the curve registration and point
31
correspondence problem in the context of fingerprint detection. We then take the
curve alignment method introduced in [93] as a building block and propose an
Iterative Alignment-Minimization (IAM) algorithm that can perform curve regis-
tration and solve the point correspondence problem simultaneously. Finally, we
present a detection example for a single curve using the IAM algorithm, and discuss
the robustness issues.
2.3.1 Problem Formulation
We use “View-I” to refer to the geometric setup of the original unmarked curve
and “View-II” to refer to the setup of the test curve. Thus, we can register the
two curves by transforming the test curve from “View-II” to “View-I”, or trans-
forming the original curve from “View-I” to “View-II”. We focus on registration
under affine transformations, which can represent combinations of scaling, rotation,
translation, reflection, and shearing. These are common geometric transformations
and can effectively model common scenarios in the printing-and-scanning process.
Under affine transformations, each point (x, y) on one curve is transformed to




















where {aij} are parameters representing the collective effect of scaling, rotation,
translation, reflection and shearing. The transform parameters can also be rep-









































































The original curve available to the detector in fingerprinting applications can
be a raster curve or a vector curve. The detector also knows the original set of
sample points (px,py) ≈ (Bcx,Bcy) that is used for estimating the set of control
points upon which spread spectrum embedding is applied. The test curve can
be a vector curve with sampled curve points (ṽx, ṽy) or a raster curve with pixel
coordinates (r̃x, r̃y). A relatively simple case is that the set of discrete points in a
test vector curve corresponds to the set of sample points used in the embedding,
except with possible affine transformations and noise addition. In this case, the














where (nx,ny) represents additional noise applied to the transformed fingerprinted
vector points, and 1 is a column vector with all 1′s. With the point correspondence
available, the only issue is curve alignment, and it can be solved by directly ap-
plying the curve alignment method in [93]. However, in addition to possible affine
transformations between the original and the test curves, the correct point cor-
respondence information may not always be available. This is especially the case
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after a fingerprinted curve undergoes vector-raster conversions and/or printing-
and-scanning. Under these situations, not only transform parameters for the curve
alignment but also the point correspondence must be estimated, in order to locate
the fingerprinted control points successfully. We consider that both the original
and the test curves are represented in raster format since a vector curve can be
rendered as a raster curve by interpolation, and that the sample points used in
fingerprinting the original curve are known to the detector. The problem can be
formulated as follows:
Given an original raster curve with a set of sample points (px,py) and a test
raster curve (r̃x, r̃y), we register the test curve with the original curve and extract
the control points of the test curve. Both transform parameters (ax, ay) (or equiv-
alently (gx,gy)) and a set of sample points (p̃x, p̃y) corresponding to the one used
in the fingerprint embedding must be found from the test curve.
2.3.2 Iterative Alignment-Minimization (IAM) Algorithm
To align the test curves with the original curves and in the mean time identify
the point correspondence of the sample points, we develop an Iterative Alignment-
Minimization (IAM) algorithm. As shown in Fig. 2.8, the IAM algorithm consists
of three main steps and the latter two steps will be executed iteratively. We
first obtain an initial estimation of the test sample points. With the estimated
point correspondence, we then perform super-curve alignment to estimate both the
transform parameters and the control points of the test curve. With the estimated
transform parameters, we refine the estimation of point correspondence through
a nearest-neighbor rule. A detailed block diagram of the proposed IAM-based
fingerprint detection is shown in Fig. 2.9.
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Figure 2.8: Basic flow and main modules of the proposed Iterative Alignment-
Minimization (IAM) algorithm.
Step-1 Initial Estimation of Sample Points on the Test Curve We ini-




y ) on the test curve using the following simple
estimator. Let M and M̃ be the number of points on the original and the test
raster curves, respectively. From the known indices J = [j0, j1, j2, . . . , jm] of the
original curve’s m + 1 sample points, where j0 < j1 < j2 < · · · < jm are integers
ranging from 0 to M − 1, we estimate the indices of the test curve’s m + 1 sam-





. Using this estimated index vector J̃, we can
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Figure 2.9: Block diagram of curve registration and fingerprint detection using the
proposed IAM algorithm.
Step-2 Curve Alignment with the Estimated Sample Points Given the




y ) for the test curve
in the ith iteration, we apply the curve alignment method in [93] to estimate the
transform parameters and the control points of the test curve. More specifically,





y ). The sample points on the test curve can be transformed back




y ). We then fit these transformed test sample points as well
as the original sample points with a single B-spline curve (referred to as a super-




y ) and the












































where P̃(i)  [ p̃(i)x p̃(i)y 1 ] and 1 is a column vector with all 1′s. The partial






x , and ĉ
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y being
zero is the necessary condition for the solution to this optimization problem. Thus,

































y ) can then be used to estimate the fingerprint
sequence and further compute the detection statistic Z(i), as described in Section
2.2.
Step-3 Refinement of Sample Point Estimation on the Test Curve Given




y ), we align the test raster curve













As the fingerprinted sample points (B(cx + αwx),B(cy + αwy)) are located at
the neighborhood of their corresponding unmarked version (Bcx,Bcy), we apply
a nearest-neighbor rule to refine the estimation of the test curve’s sample points.
More specifically, for each point of (Bcx,Bcy), we find its closest point from the









y,I ). These nearest neighbors form a refined estimate of the



































After this update, we increase i and go back to Step-2. The iteration will
continue until convergence or for an empirically determined number of times. A
total of 15 rounds of iterations are used in our experiments.
2.3.3 Detection Example and Discussions
We present a detection example employing the proposed IAM algorithm on a curve
taken from a topographic map. Shown in Fig. 2.10(a) are the original curve and a
fingerprinted curve having undergone vector-raster conversion and some geometric
transformations. The original curve consists of 367 vector points, which are used
as sample points to estimate a set of 200 control points for data embedding. Then,
a fingerprinted curve with 367 vector points is generated, rendered to be a raster
curve, and affinely transformed. After the vector-raster conversion, the point cor-
respondence is no longer directly available from the raster curve representation.
We apply the IAM algorithm to align the test curve with the original one and to
estimate the correspondence between sample points. The estimated sample points
for the test curve after one iteration and 15 iterations are shown in Fig. 2.10(b)
and Fig. 2.10(c), respectively. We can see that initially the estimated values de-
viate from the true values by a non-trivial amount, while after 15 iterations the
estimated values converge to the true values. We plot the six estimated transform
parameters for each iteration in Fig. 2.11(a), which shows an accurate registration
by the proposed IAM algorithm after half of a dozen iterations. Upon convergence,




y ) to perform detection with the finger-
print involved. The high detection statistic value shown in Fig. 2.11(b) suggests
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Figure 2.10: Register a curve using the proposed IAM algorithm: (a) the origi-
nal curve and a fingerprinted curve undergone vector-raster conversion and affine
transformations; (b) estimated sample points after one iteration; (c) estimated
sample points after 15 iterations.
The computation time for this experiment is as follows. The IAM algorithm
is implemented in Matlab 6.5 and tested on a Pentium-4 2.0GHz PC with 512M
RAM. Each iteration of the algorithm takes about 0.5 of a second, and the total
15 iterations plus the initialization take 7.61 seconds. Together with the 0.56 of
a second required for computing Z statistics with 1000 fingerprint sequences, the
total duration of the detection process is 8.17 seconds.
The above example shows that through the IAM algorithm, we can register the
test curve with the original unmarked curve and extract the fingerprinted control
points with high accuracy. With good estimation of affine transform parameters,
our data embedding method for curves is resilient to combinations of scaling, ro-
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Figure 2.11: Convergence results on estimated transform parameters and detection
statistics for the example curve in Fig. 2.10 using the proposed IAM algorithm:
(a) estimated transform parameters for each iteration; (b) fingerprint detection
statistic for each iteration.
tation, translation, and shearing. The explicit estimation of point correspondence
also provides resilience to the vector-raster and vector-raster-vector conversions.
In the vector-raster conversion case, a fingerprinted curve stored in vector format
is rendered as a raster curve, and thus the point correspondence is no longer di-
rectly available from the raster curve representation. In the vector-raster-vector
conversion case, the intermediate raster curve is converted to a vector curve with
a new set of vector points that are likely to be different from the initial vector
points prior to the conversion, even though there is little visual difference between
these two vector curves. Again the point correspondence is likely to get corrupted
by this conversion, and accurate estimation of point correspondence is a necessary
step for the successful detection of the fingerprint. With robustness resulting from
the spread spectrum embedding in B-spline control points and the IAM algorithm,
our curve fingerprinting approach can resist a number of challenging attacks and
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distortions. For example, the distortion from printing-and-scanning involves both
vector-raster rendering and a certain amount of rotation, scaling, and translation;
a fingerprinted curve in vector format may be rendered as a raster image and then
affinely transformed before reaching the detector; in the collusion scenario, collud-
ers may construct a colluded copy, print it out, and then distribute it out of the
allowed domain. In the next section, we use our curve-based data hiding approach
to fingerprint topographic maps and demonstrate the robustness of our approach
against various attacks and distortions.
2.4 Experimental Results on Map Fingerprint-
ing
We now present experimental results of the proposed curve fingerprinting algorithm
in the context of tracing and tracking topographic maps. A topographic map
provides a two-dimensional representation of the earth’s three-dimensional surface.
Vertical elevation is shown with contour lines (also known as level lines) to represent
the earth’s surfaces that are of equal altitude. Contour lines in topographic maps
often exhibit a considerable amount of variations and irregularities, prompting the
need for non-uniform sampling of curve points in the parametric modelling of the
contours. We shall first examine the fidelity of the fingerprinted map, and then
evaluate the robustness of the fingerprints against collusion, cropping, geometric
transformations, format conversions, point deletion, curve smoothing, printing-
and-scanning, and some combinations of these distortions.
Fingerprinted Topographic Maps A 1100 × 1100 topographic vector map
obtained from http://www. ablesw.com is used in our experiment. Starting with
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the original map shown in Fig. 2.12(a), we mark nine curves that are sufficiently
long. For each of these nine curves, a set of non-uniformly spaced vector points is
given by the original dataset. We directly use these points as sample points and
determine their indexing values according to the curvature-based rule presented in
Section 2.2.4. A total of 1331 control points are used to carry the fingerprint. In
Fig. 2.12(b), we overlay the nine original curves and the corresponding marked
curves using solid lines and dotted lines, respectively. To help illustrate the fidelity
of our method, we enlarge a portion of the overlaid image in Fig. 2.12(c). We can
see that the fingerprinted map preserves the geospatial information in the original
map with high precision. The perturbation can be adapted to be compliant with
cartographic industry standards and/or the need of specific applications.
Resilience to Collusion To demonstrate the resistance of the proposed method
against collusion, we present in Fig. 2.13 the detection statistics under two different
types of collusion attacks. Fig. 2.13(a) shows the collusion results under a ran-
dom interleaving attack, where the control points for each curve are equiprobably
taken from two differently fingerprinted maps. The collusion attack for Fig.2.13(b)
and (c) is known as averaging, where the coordinates of the corresponding control
points from two and five differently fingerprinted maps are averaged, respectively.
We assume the correct point correspondence is available in this test, and the cases
with unknown point correspondence will be addressed in the later subsections. As
we can see from the detection statistics, the embedded fingerprints from all con-
tributing users survive the collusion attacks and are identified with high confidence.
For both 2-user random interleaving collusion and 5-user averaging collusion, we
use 20 different sets of fingerprint sequences to evaluate the detection performance,
using a similar experiment setup to the one discussed in Section 2.2.5. The his-
42



































Figure 2.12: Fingerprinting topographic maps: (a) original map; (b) original and
fingerprinted curves overlaid with each other; (c) a zoomed-in view of (b).
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tograms and the Gaussian approximations in Fig. 2.14 show a very good separation
between the Z values for the presence and absence of true fingerprints. Compared
with the 2-user averaging collusion, the 2-user random interleaving leads to more
substantial coordinate changes in control points when a detector performs B-spline
parametrization, and such coordinate changes may follow a distribution different
from i.i.d. Gaussian. This is reflected by a reduced mean and a non-unit variance
for the fingerprint presence case.



































































Figure 2.13: Collusion test on fingerprinted vector maps: (a) 2-user random inter-
leaving collusion; (b) 2-user averaging collusion; (c) 5-user averaging collusion.
Resilience to Cropping As shown in Fig. 2.15 (a), we crop an area of a
fingerprinted vector map and use it as the test map. Among the nine curves used
44

































































Figure 2.14: Histogram and Gaussian approximation of the Z detection statistics
for collusion attacks: (a) 2-user random interleaving collusion with Gaussian ap-
proximations N (0, 1.00) and N (28.45, 2.48); (b) 5-user averaging collusion with
Gaussian approximations N (0, 1.00) and N (24.90, 1.00).
for carrying the fingerprint, only two curves are retained with sufficiently large
size. Using the original map as a reference, we perform detection on these two
retained segments and obtain the detection result shown in Fig. 2.15(b). As we
can see, the detection statistic with the correct fingerprint is still high enough so
that its corresponding user can be identified with high confidence.
Resilience to Affine Transformations on Vector Maps To demonstrate the
resilience of our approach to a substantial amount of affine transformations, we
take a fingerprinted vector map and apply a combination of rotation, scaling, and
translation. More specifically, we rotate it by −30◦, then scale it by 120% or 80% in
the X and Y directions, respectively, followed by 100- and 200-pixel translation in
the X and Y directions, respectively. The resulting vector map is rendered in Fig.
2.16(a). In this test, we assume that correct point correspondence is available.
Thus, the super-curve alignment method can be directly applied to register the
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Figure 2.15: Cropping test on fingerprinted vector maps: (a) fingerprinted map
with the cropping area; (c) Z statistics.
original and the test curves and to extract the control points. Shown in Fig. 2.16(b)
is the registered vector map, and Fig. 2.16(c) shows the detection statistics. We
can see that the embedded fingerprint can survive affine transformations, and the
detection statistic with the correct fingerprint is high after the registration.
Resilience to Vector-Raster Conversion We now examine the resilience to
vector-raster conversion coupled with possible affine transformations. Shown in
Fig. 2.17(a) is a fingerprinted vector map after raster rendering as a 1100 × 1100
image and affine transformations. The affine transformation consists of 10-degree
rotation, 80% and 140% scaling in the X and Y directions, respectively, and 10-
and 20-pixel translation in the X and Y directions, respectively. As the point
correspondence is no longer directly available after the vector-raster conversion,
we apply the proposed IAM algorithm to estimate the transform parameters and
to locate the sample points on test curves corresponding to those used in the
embedding. After 15 iterations, we get the registered raster map as shown in Fig.
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Figure 2.16: Affine transformation test on fingerprinted vector maps: (a) test map;
(b) aligned map; (c) Z statistics.
2.17(b) and the detection statistics as shown in Fig. 2.17(c). The detection statistic
results suggest that the embedded fingerprint is identified with high confidence.
Using the same settings on the computing system as in Section 2.3.3, we measure
the detection time required for this transformed raster map. The total duration of
the detection process is 42.43 seconds, including 40.05 seconds for curve registration
and fingerprint extraction from nine curves, and 2.38 seconds for evaluating Z
statistics with 1000 fingerprint sequences.
Similar to the collusion test, we plot in Fig. 2.18 the histogram and the Gaus-
sian approximation of the Z statistics for this vector-raster conversion test com-
bined with geometric transformations. The transform parameters are randomly
47
selected from the following ranges with a uniform distribution: −20 ∼ +20 de-
grees of rotation, 60% ∼ 140% scaling in the X and Y directions, and 20 ∼ 40
pixels’ translation in the X and Y directions. As the errors from registration and
re-sampling are not always i.i.d. Gaussian distributed, we observe a variance larger
than 1 for the Z values in the fingerprint presence case.











































Figure 2.17: Affine transformation test on fingerprinted raster maps: (a) test map;
(b) aligned map; (c) Z statistics.
Resilience to Vector-Raster-Vector Conversion To demonstrate the re-
silience of our method to vector-raster-vector conversion, we first render a fin-
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Figure 2.18: Histogram and Gaussian approximation N (0, 1.00) and N (21.69, 2.28)
of the Z detection statistics for the combined vector-raster conversion and geomet-
ric transformations.
gerprinted vector map as a raster map. Then, we uniformly sample it to obtain
a new vector map, which has the same number of vector points as prior to the
conversion but at different sampling locations. In the detection process, we first
render this “new” vector map as a raster map by linear interpolation and then
apply our IAM algorithm. From the high detection statistic shown in Fig. 2.19(a),
we can see that our approach is robust against the vector-raster-vector attack.
Resilience to Point Deletion in Vector and Raster Maps As we have seen
throughout the chapter, traitor tracing applications usually involve adversaries
who have strong incentives to remove fingerprints. Attackers may delete a certain
number of points from a fingerprinted vector/raster map, while keeping similar
shapes of its contour lines. Shown in Fig. 2.19(b) and (c) are detection statistics
after point deletion in a fingerprinted vector and raster map, respectively. For
the vector map, 20% of points are randomly chosen and removed from each fin-
gerprinted curve, while in the raster map 70% of black pixels on the curve are
randomly chosen and removed. We can see that the embedded fingerprints can
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survive point deletion applied to both vector maps and raster maps. Similar to the
vector-raster-vector conversion test, linear interpolation and the IAM algorithm
are used in the fingerprint detection.




































































Figure 2.19: Detection results after various attacks: (a) Z statistics for vector-
raster-vector conversion; (b) Z statistics for point deletion in vector maps; (c) Z
statistics for point deletion in raster maps.
Resilience to Curve Smoothing Similar to lowpass filtering for images, curve
smoothing can be applied to topographic maps as an attempt to remove the em-
bedded fingerprint. In order to demonstrate the resilience of the proposed method
to curve smoothing, we traverse each marked curve and apply a moving average
filter to it. A curve point with coordinates (rxi , ryi) will be replaced by a new
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where 2S + 1 is the filter length. Finally, we apply the proposed IAM algorithm
to these smoothed curves and compute the detection statistics. Two different
filter lengths, 5 and 21, are used in our experiments. As shown in Fig. 2.20, the
detection statistic with the correct fingerprint under 5-point averaging is 24.61, and
that under 21-point averaging is 9.45. Indeed, the fingerprint is weakened by the
smoothing operation, but the detection statistics are still well above the threshold
for a correct positive detection. In the latter case when a long filter is used in
the smoothing attack, some visual details have been lost from the curves. This
study shows that the proposed method is robust against curve smoothing, provided
that the smoothing does not severely change the shape of the curve, and that the
fingerprint sequence is sufficiently long to help the detector collect information for
a positive detection.




















































Figure 2.20: Curve smoothing test on fingerprinted raster maps: (a) Z statistics
for filter window size 5; (b) Z statistics for filter window size 21.
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Resilience to Printing-and-Scanning To show the robustness of our approach
against the printing-and-scanning attack, we render a fingerprinted vector map by
taking a screen shot of its display in Matlab, print out the image using a HP laser
printer, and then scan it back as a binary image using a Canon scanner with 360dpi
resolution. Preprocessing before detection includes a thinning operation to extract
one-pixel wide skeletons from the scanned curves that are usually several-pixel
wide after high-resolution scanning. As we can see from the detection results in
Fig. 2.21(a), the fingerprint survives the printing-and-scanning test and gives reli-
able positive detection with the detection statistic much higher than the detection
threshold.
To further examine our approach under the combined attack of collusion and
printing-and-scanning, we first generate a colluded map by averaging coordinates
of the corresponding control points from four users’ fingerprinted maps, then render
and print it out, and scan it back as a binary image. From the detection statistics in
Fig. 2.21(b), we can see that the embedded fingerprints from all the four colluders
can be correctly identified after this combination of attacks involving collusion,
vector-raster conversion, filtering, and affine transformations.
2.5 Chapter Summary
In summary, we have proposed a new data embedding algorithm for curves by
parameterizing a curve using the B-spline model and adding spread spectrum se-
quences to B-spline parameters. In conjunction with the basic embedding and
detection techniques, we have proposed an iterative alignment-minimization algo-
rithm to allow for robust fingerprint detection under unknown geometric trans-
formations and in the absence of explicit point correspondence. We have demon-
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Figure 2.21: Printing-and-scanning test: (a) Z statistics for printing-and-scanning;
(b) Z statistics for 4-user averaging collusion combined with printing-and-scanning.
strated the fidelity of our method as well as its robustness against collusion, crop-
ping, affine transformations, vector-raster and vector-raster-vector conversions,
point deletion, curve smoothing, printing-and-scanning, and their combinations.
Our work has shown the feasibility of the proposed algorithm in fingerprinting ap-
plications for tracing and tracking topographic maps as well as some other curve-
based graphic data such as writings/drawings from pen-based inputs. Protecting
the above graphic data to ensure its proper distribution has increasing impor-






In addition to 2-D topographic maps, geospatial data is also acquired and archived
as digital elevation maps (DEMs). A DEM provides a digital representation of
surface terrains with a set of points in the three-dimensional space. In civilian ap-
plications, high-precision DEMs carry a high commercial value owing to the large
amount of effort in acquiring them; and in military applications, DEMs are often
used to represent critical geospatial information in sensitive operations. These call
for new technologies to prevent unauthorized distribution of DEMs and to trace
traitors in the event of information leak. In this chapter, we propose a new digi-
tal fingerprinting technique to protect DEM data from illegal re-distribution. The
proposed method enables reliable detection of fingerprints from both the 3-D DEM
data set and its 2-D rendering, whichever format that is available to a detector.
Our method starts with extracting from a DEM a set of critical contours either cor-
responding to important topographic features of the terrain or having application-
dependent importance. Fingerprints are then embedded into these critical con-
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tours by employing parametric curve modeling and spread spectrum embedding
discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, a fingerprinted DEM is constructed to incorpo-
rate the marked 2-D contours. Through experimental results, we demonstrate the
cross-dimensional fingerprint detection capability of the proposed method, as well
as its robustness against a number of challenging attacks applied to either DEMs
or their contour representations.
3.1 Introduction
Digital elevation maps (DEMs) provide three-dimensional (3-D) measurements
(x, y, z) of surface terrains. The coordinates (x, y) indicate the spatial location
of a point, while the z coordinate represents its elevation. An example DEM for
the Monterey Bay region is shown in Fig. 3.1(a), where the ocean-floor depth data
are obtained from the U.S. National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) [3]. In
recent years, acquisition systems used to obtain DEM data have been improved to
achieve better resolutions in both the spatial plane and the elevation coordinate.
With such improvement, DEMs have become more widely used in military and
commercial operations, such as navigation, landing, petroleum exploration, and
land use planning. Because of the large amount of efforts that are put in acquir-
ing DEM data as well as their critical role in practical applications, many DEMs
have high commercial values and need to be protected from unauthorized copying
and re-distribution. Furthermore, DEM data used in military applications often
contain sensitive information, which prompts the need of preventing information
leak as well as tracing the source of leak.
The data points of DEMs are generally acquired and archived using a rectan-
gular grid. If we take the spatial location (x, y) as the image coordinates, and the
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.1: Digital representation of Monterey Bay, California: (a) the 3-D DEM;
(b) the corresponding representation in 2-D gray-scaled image; (c) a 2-D topo-
graphic map of the 3-D DEM.
elevation value z as the image intensity, a 3-D DEM can be represented by a gray-
scaled image, as shown in Fig. 3.1(b). Both the 3-D DEM and its corresponding
gray-scaled image representation can convey the same elevation information. A
DEM generally contains much redundant information in that neighboring points
in many areas have gradually changing elevations. Therefore, applications of the
DEM often focus on elevation contours extracted from the DEM, as opposed to
the DEM itself [53]. From a given DEM, a set of contours corresponding to certain
elevations can be extracted, forming a two-dimensional (2-D) topographic map as
shown in Fig. 3.1(c). Generally, topographic maps can convey typical geographic
features of surface terrains. Such meaningful cross-dimensional rendering of DEMs
prompts the need of cross-dimensional fingerprint detection capability, that is, fin-
gerprints shall be detected from both marked 3-D DEMs and their 2-D contour
rendering.
Since DEMs can be represented as gray-scaled images, approaches developed
for robustly watermarking images may be employed to fingerprint DEMs. One
candidate is spread spectrum embedding in the DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform)
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or DFT (Discrete Fourier Transform) domain [20]. However, such image water-
marking methods do not explicitly take the geographic meanings of DEMs into
consideration, and cannot satisfy the requirement of cross-dimensional fingerprint
detection. When an aggressive attacker renders his/her marked 3-D DEM to be
some meaningful 2-D contours but removes all the other information, the finger-
print information embedded in the DCT or DFT coefficients is most likely to be
destroyed along with the dimension reduction.
In order to combat such attack of rendering 3-D DEMs to 2-D contours as well
as other attacks and distortions to either DEMs or their contours, we extend our
curve fingerprinting method in Chapter 2 to fingerprint DEMs through hiding fin-
gerprints in the 2-D contours of a 3-D DEM data set. We start with extracting from
a DEM a set of critical contours either corresponding to important topographic
features of the terrain or having certain application-dependent importance. Fin-
gerprints are then embedded into these critical contours, and finally a fingerprinted
DEM is constructed to incorporate these marked 2-D contours. Our approach has
the potential to achieve cross-dimensional fingerprint detection, making the fin-
gerprint detectable from both the DEMs and their 2-D contour based rendering,
whichever available to a fingerprint detector.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a frame-
work of fingerprinting a DEM through hiding data in its contours. Section 3.3
describes the transformation between a 3-D DEM and its 2-D contour curves. In
Section 3.4, we discuss the tradeoff between fingerprint robustness and impercep-
tibility, and address a special attack named contour replacement. Experimental
results are presented in Section 3.5 to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
approach. Finally, we summarize this chapter in Section 3.6.
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3.2 Framework of Cross-Dimensional DEM Fin-
gerprinting
When fingerprinting a DEM through hiding data in its 2-D contours, the first step
is to determine which contours to select for hiding fingerprints. If we select some
contours to embed the fingerprint but adversaries are likely to be interested in other
elevations, they may carefully re-render the DEM data into a different set of 2-D
contours to avoid the marked elevations. Just like a natural image has perceptually
significant components, a DEM has some critical contours corresponding to either
important topographic features of a terrain such as the maxima, the minima, and
the saddle points [77], or some objects with application-dependent importance such
as oil wells. As critical contours are essential to a DEM for largely determining
terrain features or conveying valuable geospatial information, attackers are often
not willing to completely remove or seriously distort them. Therefore, we propose
to extract from a given DEM those critical contours to carry the fingerprint.
After identifying the contours to carry the hidden data, we fingerprint a DEM
through proper transformations between the 3-D DEM and its 2-D contours, and
leveraging a curve fingerprinting method developed in Chapter 2. A framework
of the proposed cross-dimensional DEM fingerprinting scheme is illustrated in
Fig. 3.2, and the main steps of fingerprint embedding and detection [39] are sum-
marized below.
In the embedding process, we first identify and extract from the given DEM a
set of critical 2-D contours. Then, we embed the fingerprint sequence into these
contours by employing B-spline based parametric curve modelling and spread spec-










































Figure 3.2: The block diagram of fingerprinting 3-D DEMs through hiding data in
2-D contours.
by modifying the elevation values of the original 3-D DEM to incorporate the
marked 2-D contours. To detect the fingerprint(s) from a suspicious DEM, we first
extract from it the critical contours at the elevations corresponding to those used
in the embedding. If the DEM data set in question has already been rendered in 2-
D contours, these rendered contours will be passed directly to the detector. Then,
we estimate a fingerprint sequence from these 2-D extracted/rendered contours,
using the IAM algorithm proposed in the Chapter 2. Finally, correlation-based
detection is performed to identify the sources of information leak.
3.3 Transformation between 3-D DEM and 2-D
Curve
Taking the fingerprint embedding and detection in the curve domain as building
blocks to hide/extract fingerprints in/from the 2-D contours of the 3-D DEM
data, the new issue remaining to be addressed in our scheme is how to carry out
proper transformations between a 3-D DEM and its 2-D contours. In the following
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subsections, we discuss how to extract 2-D contours from a 3-D DEM data set as
well as how to construct a fingerprinted 3-D DEM from marked 2-D contours.
3.3.1 Extracting Critical 2-D Contours from a DEM
Critical contours of a DEM either identify certain topographic features of the ter-
rain or depend on its usage in particular applications. Correspondingly, elevations
of critical contours, or critical elevations in short, can be obtained from analyz-
ing terrain features, or have been specified by the applications. In literature, the
Morse theory has been used to identify critical elevations corresponding to such
topographical features as maxima, minima, and saddle points [77].
Formulate a DEM as a function u : D → R, where D ⊂ R2 represents (x, y)
locations, and the function u specifies the elevation value of each location. The
upper level set of an elevation λ, denoted as [u ≥ λ], consists of locations where
the height is greater than or equal to λ, i.e., [u ≥ λ]  {(x, y) ∈ D : u(x, y) ≥ λ}.
Similarly, the lower level set of an elevation λ is defined as [u ≤ λ]  {(x, y) ∈
D : u(x, y) ≤ λ}. More generally, for λ, μ ∈ R, and λ ≤ μ, we can define a set
[λ ≤ u ≤ μ]  {(x, y) ∈ D : λ ≤ u(x, y) ≤ μ}. Further, the contour set of an
elevation λ is defined as [u = λ] = [λ ≤ u ≤ λ].
Shown in Fig. 3.3 are two major types of terrain, where maxima appear in the
Type-I terrain, and minima appear in the Type-II terrain. There are also two kinds
of saddle points, one with each type of terrain. To identify maxima/minima and
saddle points from these two types of terrain, we consider a DEM with elevation
values in the range of [a, b], a ≤ b, i.e., u : D → [a, b], and examine how the contour
set [u = λ] deforms as λ continually decreases from b to a. For the Type-I terrain
shown in Fig. 3.3(a), each time when we come across a maximum, a small curve
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appears in the contour set, as the situation for elevation λ1. If there is a saddle
point, as for elevation λ2, two relatively short curves merge into a single curve.
For the Type-II terrain shown in Fig. 3.3(b), when decreasing the elevation from
b to a, a small curve disappears at each minimum, e.g. at elevation λ3, while a
single curve splits into two short ones at a saddle point, e.g., at elevation λ4. By
observing the above topology changes along with the moving contour set, critical






Figure 3.3: The two types of terrain and their critical elevations: (a) Type-I with
maxima and saddle points; (b) Type-II with minima and saddle points.
As there may be many small oscillations in a terrain, directly employing the
above method may result in many critical elevations, some of which may not repre-
sent significant topographic features of the terrain. In order to find major critical
elevations, Extrema filters are utilized in [77] to remove small oscillations while
preserving major topographic changes. Applying Extrema filtering to a DEM,
elevation values around maxima(mimina) are decreased(increased) by a certain
amount so that small oscillations can be flattened. From such a filtered DEM,
major critical elevations can then be identified using the Morse theory described
above.
After obtaining the critical elevations, either directly specified by particular
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applications or found using the Morse theory, we now extract their corresponding
critical contours. For each critical elevation λ, we first identify its upper level
set [u ≥ λ]  {(x, y) ∈ D : u(x, y) ≥ λ}. Assigning 0′s to the locations in the
upper level set and 1′s to the other locations, we then generate a binary image Bλ.








with Bλ, we identify boundary points of the upper level set [u ≥ λ] as those in
[u ≥ λ] and with a positive value in the filtered image Bλ⊗h, and take them as the
contour at elevation λ, i.e., [u = λ] = {(x, y) ∈ D : Bλ(x, y) = 0∧Bλ⊗h(x, y) > 0}.
In Fig. 3.4, we show an example of contour detection using the above method.
Finally, we employ a curve following algorithm in [11] to traverse the contour and
represent it using a set of ordered curve points.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.4: An example of contour detection: (a) binary image Bλ with black
points in the upper level set; (b) detected contour points represented in the black
color.
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3.3.2 Constructing Fingerprinted DEM from Marked 2-D
Contours
In the final step of fingerprint embedding, we construct a fingerprinted DEM to
incorporate those marked critical contours so that the fingerprint embedded in
2-D contours is also detectable from this newly constructed 3-D DEM. In order
to reliably detect the fingerprint embedded in the 2-D contours, we need to make
the marked 2-D contours recoverable from this newly constructed DEM with high
accuracy. Additionally, in order to preserve the geospatial information conveyed
by the DEM, we need to make the distortion between this newly constructed DEM
and the original DEM as small as possible.
As shown in Fig. 3.5, the original contour at elevation λ is present as the
boundary of the upper level set [u ≥ λ] for the original DEM u : D → R. After
curve-based fingerprinting, the original contour is slightly deviated to be a marked
contour (we exaggerate the difference between the original and the marked contours
in Fig. 3.5 for illustration). Such 2-D contour deformation can be implemented
through appropriately modifying elevation values in the 3-D digital elevation map.
In the modified DEM u′ : D → R (i.e., the fingerprinted DEM in our context),
the marked contour shall be detected as the boundary of a new upper level set
[u′ ≥ λ] for the same elevation λ. To accomplish this, we modify elevation values
in the non-overlapping regions of the two upper level sets [u ≥ λ] and [u′ ≥ λ].
Specifically, we increase the elevation value to be λ for locations that are in [u′ ≥ λ]
but not in [u ≥ λ] (“+” region in Fig. 3.5), decrease it to be slightly smaller than
λ for those that are in [u ≥ λ] but not in [u′ ≥ λ] (“-” region in Fig. 3.5), and keep
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λ (x, y) ∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) /∈ [u ≥ λ]
λ − δ (x, y) /∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) ∈ [u ≥ λ]
u(x, y) otherwise
, (3.1)
where δ is a positive number to specify the amount of elevation adjustment. One
possible choice of δ is to use the smallest unit of the elevation coordinate, which
is determined by the DEM vertical resolution.
Original contour 
boundary of [u ]
Marked contour 









Figure 3.5: Construct the fingerprinted 3-D DEM.
When the marked contour maintains high fidelity with respect to its original
version, non-overlapping regions between the two upper level sets [u ≥ λ] and
[u′ ≥ λ] are actually very small. Using (3.1) with the smallest elevation unit for
δ, we further make the minimal amount of changes in the fingerprinted DEM to
incorporate the marked contours. Therefore, our fingerprinted DEM can preserve
the geospatical information conveyed by the original DEM with high precision.
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3.4 Robustness and Fidelity Considerations
In this section, we discuss the tradeoff between embedding fidelity and fingerprint’s
robustness when fingerprinting a 3-D DEM through hiding data in its rendered 2-D
contours. We also propose a new attack named contour replacement and discuss
the robustness of our method against this challenging attack.
3.4.1 Embedding Fidelity and Fingerprint’s Robustness
When fingerprinting a DEM, we hide the fingerprint sequence into its critical con-
tours. If the total length of contours that are used in the embedding is larger (e.g.,
we may use more contours and/or longer contours), most likely we can have a larger
number of B-spline control points that can host a longer fingerprint sequence to
achieve stronger resilience against distortions. However, when more and/or longer
contours are manipulated to carry a longer fingerprint sequence, larger distortions
may be introduced to the fingerprinted DEM.
We now examine the fidelity and robustness issues in the construction of fin-
gerprinted 3-D DEMs. To achieve cross-dimensional fingerprint detection, we con-
struct the 3-D fingerprinted DEM u′ : D → R in a way that the original 2-D contour
can be accurately deformed to be a marked 2-D contour, as in (3.1) of Section 3.3.2.
During the contour deformation, elevation values in the non-overlapping regions
(C ⊂ R2) of the two upper level sets [u ≥ λ] and [u′ ≥ λ] are either increased
or decreased. A non-trivial elevation difference may be observed when a point
(x, y) ∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) /∈ [u ≥ λ] has an elevation value much smaller than λ,
because it shall be increased to λ in the fingerprinted DEM u′. Similarly, for a
point (x, y) ∈ [u ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) /∈ [u′ ≥ λ] with an elevation value much larger than
λ, its elevation will be decreased to λ− δ in the fingerprinted DEM u′, which also
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results in a non-trivial distortion. To preserve high fidelity of the fingerprinted
DEM, we propose to employ thresholding on the point-wise elevation distortion to
determine the points in the non-overlapping regions C that should actually change
their elevation values. Setting a threshold τ > 0, a point (x, y) ∈ C gets its eleva-
tion changed from the original u(x, y) to u′(x, y) only when |u(x, y)− u′(x, y)| ≤ τ
is satisfied:
u′λ→λ,τ (x, y) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
λ (x, y)∈ [u′≥λ] ∧ (x, y)/∈ [u≥λ] ∧ λ−u(x, y)≤τ
λ − δ (x, y)/∈ [u′≥λ] ∧ (x, y)∈ [u≥λ] ∧ u(x, y)−(λ−δ)≤τ
u(x, y) otherwise
.(3.2)
The thresholding with τ can effectively limit the maximal point-wise elevation
distortion in the fingerprinted DEM to be no more than τ . However, it may affect
the accuracy of deforming the original contour to the target marked contour, i.e.,
deviation may exist between the contour extracted from the fingerprinted DEM
and the marked contour generated from fingerprinting the original contour. Such
deviation has a negative effect on the detection accuracy of fingerprints that are
virtually embedded in contours. Therefore, we need to make a tradeoff between
embedding fidelity and fingerprint robustness, and the threshold τ can be tuned
according to application requirements.
3.4.2 Robustness against Contour Replacement Attack
Through hiding data in critical 2-D contours of a DEM, our method is effective
in combating the attack of rendering a fingerprinted DEM to a topographic map,
which contains some or all of the marked 2-D contours because of their critical role
in conveying geospatial information. As neighboring points in a DEM often have
gradually changing elevation values, a fingerprinted contour can be approximated
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by or inferred from its neighboring contours. Taking advantage of this property, an
aggressive attacker may move one step further to remove the fingerprinted contour
itself but preserve some of its neighboring contours during the 2-D rendering. We
refer to this attack as a contour replacement attack, and discuss how to make our
method resilient to this challenging attack.
Band Deformation to Combat Contour Replacement Attack Use the
contour at elevation λ to carry the fingerprint. Now, we consider the following
contour replacement attack. In the 2-D rendering of the 3-D fingerprinted DEM,
the attacker removes the marked contour at elevation λ, but preserves one of
its neighboring contours at elevation β ∈ [λmin, λmax] (λmin ≤ λ ≤ λmax). To
combat such a contour replacement attack, we modify the construction of the
fingerprinted 3-D DEM so that all contours in the “elevation band” of [λmin, λmax]
will be deformed to be the target marked contour. Considering the property of
[u ≥ λ1] ⊃ [u ≥ λ2] and [u < λ2] ⊃ [u < λ1] when λ1 < λ2, such band deformation
can be obtained through jointly deforming the two contours at the two elevation




λmin (x, y) ∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) /∈ [u ≥ λmin]





λmax (x, y) ∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) /∈ [u ≥ λmax]
λmax − δ (x, y) /∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) ∈ [u ≥ λmax]
u(x, y) otherwise
, (3.3)
where δ is still a positive number that can be as small as the smallest unit of the
elevation coordinate. Because [u ≥ λmin] ⊃ [u ≥ λmax] and [u < λmax] ⊃ [u <
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λmin] for λmin < λmax, we can further combine the two operations in (3.3) so that




λmax (x, y) ∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) /∈ [u ≥ λmax]
λmin − δ (x, y) /∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) ∈ [u ≥ λmin]
u(x, y) otherwise
. (3.4)
Through (3.4), for a point (x, y) in the upper level set prescribed by the marked
contour at elevation λ, i.e., (x, y) ∈ [u′ ≥ λ], we increase its elevation value to
λmax if its original elevation u(x, y) < λmax. On the contrary, for a point (x, y) /∈
[u′ ≥ λ], we decrease its elevation to be λmin − δ if its original elevation u(x, y) ≥
λmin. All the other points keep their elevation values the same as their original
correspondences. With such band deformation, the contour at any elevation β ∈
[λmin, λmax] is deformed to be the target marked contour. This enables us to
successfully combat the contour replacement attack within the elevation range
of [λmin, λmax]. However, along with this robustness achievement, the elevation
modification according to (3.4) may introduce a large distortion to the fingerprinted
DEM u′, especially when values of λmin and λmax deviate from λ with a large
amount. Thus, here we still need to make a tradeoff between embedding fidelity
and fingerprint robustness, and the values of λmin and λmax can also be tuned
according to specific application requirements.
To improve the embedding fidelity, one way is to apply the thresholding tech-
nique as discussed in Section 3.4.1. A point (x, y) will get its elevation changed
from u(x, y) to u′(x, y) according to (3.4) only when |u(x, y) − u′(x, y)| ≤ τ . In
order to achieve the band deformation so that any contour in [λmin, λmax] is de-
formed in the same way toward the target marked contour, the threshold τ shall
be no less than the elevation range, i.e. τ ≥ λmax − λmin. Since the value of
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τ determines the maximal point-wise elevation distortion after fingerprinting, this
again indicates the tradeoff between embedding fidelity and fingerprint robustness.
When a contour replacement attack in a larger elevation range is to be combatted,
the maximal point-wise elevation distortion to be introduced is also larger.
Gradual Band Deformation to Improve Embedding Fidelity Considering
that a marked contour may be more likely to be replaced with a neighboring
contour closer to it, it is desirable to gradually adjust the amount of deformation
applied to the nearby contours. When a contour has an elevation farther away from
the target elevation λ, it may be deformed toward the target marked contour with
lower accuracy. In our work, we modify the construction of the fingerprinted DEM
u′ as follows to combat the contour replacement attack in the range of [λmin, λmax]
with gradual deformation adjustment:




min{λmax, u(x, y) + τ} (x, y) ∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) /∈ [u ≥ λmax]
max{λmin − δ, u(x, y) − τ} (x, y) /∈ [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ (x, y) ∈ [u ≥ λmin]
u(x, y) otherwise
,(3.6)
where τ > 0 is a desirable threshold and δ can still be the smallest unit of the
elevation coordinate. Specifically, for locations that are in [u′ ≥ λ] but not in
[u ≥ λmax], we increase the elevation value to be the minimal of λmax and u(x, y)+τ ,
instead of λmax in (3.4). Similarly, for those in [u ≥ λmin] but not in [u′ ≥ λ], we
decrease the elevation value to be the maximal of λmin − δ and u(x, y) − τ .
Through the construction in (3.6), we can achieve a better tradeoff between
embedding fidelity and fingerprint robustness. First, we keep the maximal point-
wise elevation distortion after fingerprinting to be no larger than a threshold τ .
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This is because the maximal increment/decrement happened in (3.6) is limited by
τ . Meanwhile, τ can be independent of [λmin, λmax] since we are not targeting at
uniform band deformation. Second, the above construction can achieve gradual
contour deformation as follows. As shown in Fig. 3.6(a) by using one contour at
elevation λ = 510 with λmin = 480, λmax = 540, and τ = 25 as one example, after
the specified elevation increment to min{λmax, u(x, y) + τ}, for an elevation value
β ∈ [λmin, λmax], more points are available in the area of [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ [u < λmax]
deforming the contour at β toward the target marked contour when β is further
away from λmax (540 in Fig. 3.6(a)). Similarly, as shown in Fig. 3.6(b) for the
elevation decrement case, we have more points in the area of [u′ < λ] ∧ [u ≥ λmin]
to deform the contour when β is further away from λmin (510 in Fig. 3.6(b)).
Since both of the above two point sets contribute to the contour deformation
at β ∈ [λmin, λmax], collectively more points are available for an elevation in the
middle range of [λmin, λmax] (as shown in Fig. 3.6(c) around λ = 510), and therefore
a contour in the middle range can be deformed toward the target marked contour
with higher accuracy.








































































Figure 3.6: Number of points available for deforming the contour at elevation
β ∈ [λmin, λmax]: (a) in the area of [u′ ≥ λ] ∧ [u < λmax]; (b) in the area of
[u′ < λ] ∧ [u ≥ λmin]; (c) combining the two cases in (a) and (b) together.
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3.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we apply the proposed 3-D DEM fingerprinting method to finger-
print two data sets from NGDC [3], namely, the Monterey Bay DEM shown in
Fig. 3.1 and the Hawaii DEM shown in Fig. 3.7. We present experimental results
to demonstrate the effectiveness of our cross-dimensional fingerprinting method,











Figure 3.7: Hawaii DEM data set represented as a gray valued image.
For the Monterey Bay DEM data set, we uniformly sample 341× 411 points in
an area of latitude 36◦30′n ∼ 37◦4′n and longitude 122◦26′w ∼ 121◦45′w. In our
experiments, we focus on its ocean part, whose deepest point has an elevation of
-2918 meter. For the Hawaii data set, 551 × 601 points are uniformly sampled in
an area of latitude 19◦n ∼ 19◦55′n and longitude 155◦w ∼ 156◦w. Here, the land
terrain is focused, and elevation of the highest point is 4188 meter. For both data
sets, the smallest unit in the elevation coordinate is 1 meter, which is used in our
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tests to determine the adjustment parameter δ = 1 . Using the Morse theory and
the concept of upper level sets as discussed in [77] and presented in Section 3.3.1,
we extract from the Monterey Bay DEM three critical contours corresponding to
saddle points at elevation -802, -494, and -220 respectively, for carrying fingerprint
sequences. For the Hawaii DEM data set, we embed fingerprint sequences into three
contours at elevation 510, 891, and 1528, respectively. To generate a fingerprint
sequence, we employ a pseudo-random number generator to produce a sequence
of independent random numbers and use different seeds for different users. The
scaling factor upon fingerprint sequences is set as 1.
Effectiveness of Cross-dimensional DEM Fingerprinting: In our test, we
first examine the tradeoff between embedding fidelity and fingerprint robustness
by using different thresholds τ in the process of constructing a fingerprinted DEM
u′λ→λ,τ (x, y), as discussed in Section 3.4.1. The thresholding rule of |u(x, y) −
u′(x, y)| ≤ τ naturally limits the maximal point-wise elevation distortion in the
fingerprinted DEM to be at most the threshold τ . In our tests, we also evaluate






y=1 |u′(x, y) − u(x, y)|2
M × N , (3.7)
where M × N is the size of the DEM. As the square root of the mean square
error, the RMSE indicates the average elevation difference between two DEMs. As
shown in Fig. 3.8(a) for the Monterey DEM, and Fig. 3.8(b) for the Hawaii DEM,
with a smaller threshold, the fingerprinted DEM has a smaller RMSE besides
a smaller maximal elevation distortion specified by the threshold itself. This is
because a smaller threshold can keep more elevation values in the original DEM
unchanged during the construction of the fingerprinted DEM. In our experiment,
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we test several thresholds in [5, 25]. When the maximal threshold value of 25 is
used, the RSME for the Monterey DEM is 0.19, and that for the Hawaii DEM
is 0.13. With the minimal threshold of 5, the RMSE can be as small as 0.025
for both the Monterey DEM and the Hawaii DEM. This demonstrates that our
method can obtain fingerprinted DEMs with high fidelity. While maintaining the
fingerprint invisibility using the thresholding technique, we further examine if the
embedded fingerprint can be extracted with high confidence. We compute a Z
statistic between the extracted fingerprint with the true fingerprint. As we know
from Chapter 2, different thresholds on the Z statistic correspond to different
probabilities of false alarm Pfa, and we re-list several of them in TABLE 3.1. The
selection of the threshold on the Z statistic depends on application requirements,
and our following tests shall set it as 4.5 which gives us a Pfa on the order of 10
−6.
As shown in Fig. 3.8(c) for the Monterey DEM and Fig. 3.8(d) for the Hawaii DEM,
the larger the threshold τ , the larger the Z statistic with the true fingerprint. With
the minimal τ = 5, a Z detection statistic of 5.34 is obtained from the fingerprinted
Monterey DEM, and a Z value of 9.25 is from the fingerprinted Hawaii DEM.
Combining performance on both embedding fidelity and fingerprint robustness,
we demonstrate the effectiveness of our cross-dimensional fingerprinting method
in that we can reliably extract the fingerprint embedded into 2-D rendering of a
fingerprinted DEM while preserving its high fidelity with the original DEM.
Table 3.1: Thresholds on the Z statistic with corresponding probabilities of false alarm.
Threshold on Z 3 4.5 6 7.5 9 
Probabilities
of false alarm Pfa
1.3 10-3 3.4 10-6 0.97 10-9 3.1 10-14 1.1 10-19
Fingerprint Robustness against Further Processing: In our second test,
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(a) Monterey DEM (b) Hawaii DEM






































(c) Monterey DEM (d) Hawaii DEM
Figure 3.8: Tradeoff between imperceptibility and robustness of fingerprints with
different thresholds τ used in constructing the fingerprinted DEM: (a-b) RMSE
vs. thresholds for the Monterey and Hawaii DEM, (c-d) detection statistics vs.
thresholds for the Monterey and Hawaii DEM.
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we examine fingerprint robustness against common signal processing operations as
well as geometric distortions. In the embedding, we employ the thresholding rule
as in (3.2) with a threshold of 20, and obtain a fingerprinted Monterey DEM with
RMSE = 0.14, and a fingerprinted Hawaii DEM with RMSE = 0.10. We then act
as attackers and apply different distortions to the fingerprinted DEM. From this
distorted fingerprinted DEM, we extract the contours corresponding to those used
in the embedding, and then perform correlation-based detection. The attacks
we test include additive Gaussian noise with a zero mean and a unit standard
deviation, 3 × 3 Gaussian low-pass filtering with a standard deviation σ = 0.5,
and some affine transformations (10◦ rotation, 1.2× scaling, and 0.8× scaling). In
TABLE 3.2, we list the Z detection statistics with the true fingerprint sequences
after applying the above attacks to each of the two DEM data sets. We can see all
these Z values are higher than the detection threshold of 4.5 (corresponding to a
probability of false alarm on the order of 10−6) and suggest positive identification of
the correct fingerprint. When more and/or longer contours or larger DEM data sets
are used to carry fingerprints, we can have a larger number of markable features.
This in turn enables us to obtain higher detection statistics that lead to higher
robustness against attacks, and/or to assign orthogonal fingerprint sequences to
more users. When attacks and distortions are applied to the 2-D rendering of
the DEM consisting of the fingerprinted contours, Chapter 2 has demonstrated
the fingerprint’s robustness against many challenging attacks such as cropping,
geometric distortions, curve smoothing, and printing-and-scanning.
Fingerprint Robustness against Multi-user Collusion: Here we demon-
strate the robustness of the proposed method in combating collusion attacks in
fingerprinting applications. Using two different fingerprinting sequences, which
75
Table 3.2: Detection statistics with true fingerprints after various attacks on the
fingerprinted DEMs.
Z statistics with fingerperints Attacks
Monterey DEM Hawaii DEM 
Additive Gaussian noise (  = 1) 5.89 11.95 
Gaussian lowpass filtering (3x3,  = 0.5) 5.18   8.10 
Rotation (10 degree) 6.82 16.86 
Scaling (1.2x) 9.41 17.85 
Scaling (0.8x) 6.88 16.86 
are generated using a random number generator with different keys, we create two
fingerprinted copies for each DEM data set. In the embedding, we still apply the
thresholding rule in (3.2) with a threshold of 20. On the attacker side, the two fin-
gerprinted DEMs are averaged to be a colluded DEM. Taking this colluded DEM
as the test data set, we then extract the target contours and perform correlation-
based detection. The detection results are shown in Fig. 3.9(a) for the Monterey
DEM, and Fig. 3.9(b) for the Hawaii DEM, respectively. For both data sets, high
Z statistics are obtained for the correct positive detection with the fingerprint se-
quences corresponding to both colluders, while small Z statistics are returned for
the correct negative detection with other sequences of innocent users.
Effectiveness of Combating Contour Replacement Attack: Finally, we
evaluate the embedding fidelity and detection reliability when using the method
proposed in Section 3.4.2 to combat the contour replacement attack. In the fol-
lowing, for a given elevation λ, we use a parameter called elevation tolerance λ
to specify the upper and lower elevation bounds (i.e.,λmax and λmin) of its neigh-
boring contours that may be used to replace the fingerprinted contour at elevation
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(a) Monterey DEM (b) Hawaii DEM




λmin = λ− λ
λmax = λ+ λ
. (3.8)
After getting a marked contour at elevation λ, we use (3.4) to construct a fin-
gerprinted DEM u′ to overcome the contour replacement attack in a range of
[λmin, λmax]. To maintain fidelity of the fingerprinted DEM, we further enforce the
thresholding procedure so that a point (x, y) will keep its elevation unchanged if
|u(x, y)−u′(x, y)| > τ . In order to obtain uniform band deformation for combating
the contour replacement attack in the range of [λmin, λmax], it is required that the
threshold of τ ≥ λmax − λmin, which is 2× λ in our case. Varying the elevation
tolerance λ from 10 to 30 with an increment of 10 while setting the threshold
τ = 2× λ, we first evaluate the detection performance. Under each value of
λ, for a marked contour at elevation λ, we extract several of its neighboring
contours in the elevation range of [λ − 30, λ + 30] with an increment of 5. Then,
we estimate a fingerprint sequence from each of these neighboring contours, and
calculate its Z statistic with the true fingerprint. As shown in Fig. 3.10(a) for
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the Monterey DEM, and Fig. 3.10(b) for the Hawaii DEM, respectively, we obtain
high and uniformly equal Z statistics with the true fingerprint within each of the
designed tolerance ranges. This demonstrates a uniform band deformation which
can successfully combat the challenging contour replacement attack. Obviously, a
larger elevation tolerance λ enables us to combat a contour replacement attack
applied to a larger elevation band. In our test, we also evaluate fidelity of the
fingerprinted DEM when the elevation tolerance λ varies. As shown in Fig. 3.11
for both DEM data sets, the RMSE of the fingerprinted DEM with the original
DEM increases with the elevation tolerance λ. When λ takes the value of 30,
the RMSE for the Monterey DEM is 0.90 while that for the Hawaii DEM is 0.77.
As for the maximal point-wise elevation distortion, it is limited by the threshold
τ which is 20, 40, and 60 corresponding to λ = 10, 20, and 30, respectively.











































(a) Monterey DEM (b) Hawaii DEM
Figure 3.10: Detection statistics from neighboring contours for different values of
the elevation tolerance λ.
In the following, we evaluate the performance of using gradual band deforma-
tion to combat the contour replacement attack. With an elevation tolerance of
λ = 30 and a threshold of τ = 25, we construct a fingerprinted DEM u′ using the
gradual band deformation in (3.6). Then, we apply the same detection procedure
from neighboring contours as above, and obtain detection statistics with the true
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(a) Monterey DEM (b) Hawaii DEM
Figure 3.11: Fidelity of the fingerprinted DEM for different values of the elevation
tolerance λ.
fingerprints. As shown in Fig. 3.12, the proposed gradual band deformation indeed
returns higher detection statistics from neighboring contours that are closer to the
target elevation (λ = 0). As for the embedding fidelity, we obtain a fingerprinted
copy with RMSE = 0.74 for the Monterey DEM, and a fingerprinted copy with
RMSE = 0.70 for the Hawaii DEM. Both of them are smaller than their corre-
sponding RMSEs under the uniform band deformation (0.90 for Monterey DEM,
and 0.77 for Hawaii DEM). An important improvement of the gradual band defor-
mation over the uniform band deformation is at the maximal point-wise elevation
distortion, which is largely decreased from the previous 60 to the current 25. This
is because that the threshold τ in the gradual band deformation is no longer re-
quired to be larger than λmax − λmin, and a smaller τ gives us a smaller maximal
point-wise elevation distortion.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In summary, we have extended the curve-based data embedding to fingerprint-
ing digital elevation maps for preventing them from illegal re-distribution. The
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(a) Monterey DEM (b) Hawaii DEM
Figure 3.12: Detection statistics from neighboring contours for gradual band de-
formation with the threshold of 25.
proposed cross-dimensional data embedding method enables reliable detection of
fingerprints from both a 3-D DEM data set and its 2-D rendering, whichever format
that is available to a detector. Both embedding and detection of the fingerprint are
virtually performed in the domain of contour curves, and the new issue of proper
transformations between a 3-D DEM and its 2-D contours has been raised and
addressed. We have examined the tradeoff between fidelity of the fingerprinted
DEM and robustness of fingerprints, and have also introduced several fine-tuning
techniques to adjust the tradeoff.
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Chapter 4
Watermarking Binary Images for
Authentication and Annotation
A large amount of graphic data are stored and archived in the raster format, i.e.,
as a binary bitmap image with a 2-D array of black/white pixels. Due to the
ease of digital editing on images, we are no longer in a world of “pictures never
lie”. For a variety of binary images, such as digitized signatures and scanned
checks/documents, it is of utmost importance to verify their authenticity and
to detect tampering. Extrinsic techniques via data embedding can be used for
this authentication purpose [90]. A pre-determined pattern or some content fea-
ture is taken as the watermark and then seamlessly embedded into the original
image. When the content of the watermarked image is altered, the embedded
watermark will change accordingly, providing evidence that the image has been
tampered. Such watermarking-based authentication relies on fragility of the em-
bedded data, and generally requires a high embedding payload to accommodate
the pre-determined patterns or content features. As there is no “true” image
before the authentication, blind detection is required, i.e., the hidden data shall
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be extracted without using the original image. In this chapter, we incorporate
a recently proposed steganography framework known as the wet paper coding to
achieve high-payload data embedding in binary images for the authentication pur-
pose. To maintain good perceptual quality of watermarked binary images under a
high embedding payload, we further develop an adaptive trimming method and in-
troduce a new concept of super-pixels to address the pixel flippability issue unique
to binary graphic data. Having the capability of hiding a large amount of data in
binary images with high fidelity can also facilitate steganography and annotation
of important raster graphic data in the digital domain.
4.1 Introduction and Prior Art
Hiding data in binary images is a challenging problem. Different from the wide
range of brightness levels or colors appearing in gray-valued or color images, black
and white are the only two colors in a binary image and they are drastically
different to our eyes. Therefore, we cannot rely on minor tuning on the pixel colors
to embed data into a binary image, and the only operation that can be taken is
black-white or white-black flipping. Further, in order to preserve perceptual quality
of marked binary images, those pixels to be flipped for carrying the hidden data
must be carefully chosen. It has been shown that such flippable pixels have an
uneven spatial distribution in most non-dithered binary images [90]. Studies have
shown that when maintaining a simple embedding module to embed one bit in
one image block (such as through quantization based embedding), this uneven
distribution makes it difficult to hide a large amount of data [89]. This is because
the decoder would have to know precisely how many bits are hidden in each part of
an image, but there is no room for conveying such overhead information. In order
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to hide into a binary image a large amount of data that can be extracted without
using the original image (i.e., blind detection), this uneven distribution issue must
be properly addressed.
Hiding data in binary images has received a considerable amount of attention
since the 1990s. The bi-level constraint limits the extension of many approaches
proposed for gray-scale or color images to binary images, and hiding a large amount
of data and detecting without the original binary image is particularly difficult for
an additive approach [57]. Several methods for hiding data in specific types of
binary images have been proposed by taking advantage of unique characteristics of
these images. For example, information is embedded in dithered images by manip-
ulating the dithering patterns [42,64], in other kinds of halftone images by tuning
the process of generating a corresponding kind of halftone images [32,47,72]. Max-
emchuk et al. changed line spacing and character spacing to embed information in
textual images for bulk electronic publications [65]. Our B-spline based method in
Chapter 2 can also be applied to hiding data in binary images consisting of curve
components. However, these approaches cannot be easily extended to binary im-
ages which may not have specific structures. In addition, the amount of data that
can be hidden using many of these methods is quite limited, and the original host
data is often required in the detection.
Applications of authentication, annotation, and steganography generally re-
quire high-payload embedding with blind detection. A common framework of such
data embedding in binary images is first identifying flippable pixels, which can be
flipped from white to black or vice versa without introducing noticeable artifacts.
Then, the watermark is embedded through enforcing properties of a group of pixels
via local manipulation of a small number of flippable pixels. For example, Matsui
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et al. embed data in fax images by manipulating the run-length features [64]. Mei
et al. first scan the image in a pre-determined order to extract objects (such as a
connected letter or stroke) and then the data is embedded in the outer boundary
of an object at a rate of one bit per a five-pixel long boundary if the center pixel of
such a boundary pattern is deemed flippable [66]. Koch and Zhao proposed a data
hiding algorithm through changing some pixels around contours to enforce the ra-
tio of black vs. white pixels in a block to be larger or smaller than 1 [52]. Enforcing
block-based feature to hide data is also used in the work by Wu et al. [90,91], where
the uneven distribution of flippable pixels is identified and handled by applying
random shuffling to equalize the distribution prior to embedding.
As we shall see later in this chapter, the shuffling approach in [90, 91] can be
viewed as a special case of the general paradigm of wet paper coding [27–29] to
be employed in our work. Here, we shall review this shuffling-based data hiding
technique in more details. Taking the human perception into account, the shuffling
approach first assigns a flippability score in [0, 1] to each pixel, quantifying how
unnoticeable the flipping of a pixel is to human observers. Pixels with scores high
enough can be considered as flippable pixels. In most binary images, the distribu-
tion of flippable pixels vary dramatically across the image, with no flippable pixels
in the uniformly white or black regions, while quite a few on rugged boundaries.
In order to handle such uneven distribution to hide more data while maintaining
a simple block-based parity-enforcing embedding, random shuffling is performed
prior to embedding. After the shuffling, the formerly identified flippable pixels
now occur much more evenly across the image. Then, the shuffled pixels are di-
vided into groups of appropriate size, and if necessary the pixel with the highest
flippability score in that group is flipped to enforce the block parity. A bit “0” (or
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“1”) is embedded by enforcing the total number of black pixels in the group to be
an even (or odd) number. Through shuffling, flippable pixels in complex regions
and along rugged boundaries can be dynamically assigned to carry more data than
less active regions, without the need of specifying much side information that is
image dependent. Shuffling also enhances security since the receiver side needs the
shuffling table or a key for generating the table to correctly extract the hidden
data. A disadvantage of shuffling, however, is that the number of hidden bits is
considerably smaller than the total number of flippable pixels and the utilization
of flippable pixels is still quite limited. This limitation is in part due to retaining
a relatively simple embedding and detection technique for hiding each bit, and to
ensure that every group has at least one flippable, the average number of flippables
per group needs to be sufficiently large.
In this chapter, we investigate how to incorporate a recently introduced ap-
proach to steganography called “writing on wet paper” [27–29] to solve the prob-
lem of high-payload, high-fidelity data embedding in binary images. In writing on
wet paper, the encoder first identifies a set of k changeable (flippable) pixels and
modifies them to embed a secret message. Although the decoder has no knowledge
about the location of flippable pixels, the encoder can communicate on average
k bits by applying a “wet paper code” (WPC), also known as codes for memory
with defective cells [84]. The basic idea of WPC-based embedding is to estab-
lish and solve a set of linear equations taking the flippables as unknowns and a
pseudo-random binary matrix D as coefficients. Through randomized projections
brought by D, the WPC scheme can naturally handle the uneven distribution of
flippables in a binary image. By jointly considering the embedding of multiple
bits as opposed to sticking with the simple technique of hiding one bit at a time,
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the average number of hidden bits can approach the number of flippable pixels,
suggesting a potentially significant gain in the embedding payload over the prior
art. Along with the high utilization of flippable pixels, a large number of flippable
pixels shall be actually flipped in the embedding process and this may affect the
perceptual quality of watermarked binary images. To achieve a better tradeoff be-
tween the embedding payload and the embedding imperceptibility, we propose an
adaptive trimming method to perform flippability assignment on individual pixels
in a binary image, and also introduce a new concept of super-pixels to address the
dependencies among the flippability of a group of pixels. Since a certain level of
resilience against noise is desirable in some content-based authentication applica-
tions, we also analyze the robustness of WPC-based data embedding against minor
processing and distortions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we discuss the
incorporation of wet paper codes for data hiding in binary images, including the
basic embedding and detection scheme, analysis on the embedding payload, and the
relationship between the previous shuffling approach and the new wet paper codes.
In Section 4.3, we propose two mechanisms, adaptive trimming and super-pixels,
with the aim of achieving a better tradeoff between the embedding payload and the
perceptual impact of data hiding. Experimental results are provided in Section 4.4
to demonstrate the advantages of using the proposed techniques in hiding data
in binary images. In Section 4.5, we discuss the watermark’s robustness in the
WPC-based data embedding, and compare it with the shuffling approach. Finally,
we summarize this chapter in Section 4.6.
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4.2 Data Embedding in Binary Images Using Wet
Paper Codes
The wet paper coding (WPC) was proposed as a solution for a scenario that
frequently occurs in steganography called “writing on wet paper” [27–29]. It is
also known in the information theory literature as “writing to a computer memory
with defective cells” [41,84,96]. To explain this metaphor, imagine that the cover
object x is an image that was exposed to rain and the encoder can only slightly
modify the dry spots of x but not the wet spots. During transmission, the stego
image y dries out and thus the decoder does not know which pixels the sender has
modified for carrying the stego information. The task of wet paper coding is to
enable both parties to exchange secret messages. The problem of data embedding
in binary images fits this “writing on wet paper” paradigm quite well, if we consider
that flippable pixels can be viewed as dry spots, and non-flippable ones as wet
spots. Since embedding may modify the flippability scores of neighboring pixels,
the watermark detector will not be able to correctly identify the pixels that were
used for embedding.
Using WPC embedding to replace the shuffling and block-based embedding
module in [90, 91], we can build an improved data hiding system for binary im-
ages [87]. Shown in Figure 4.1 is a block diagram of the embedding and extraction
process of the proposed approach. In the embedding procedure, a set of k change-
able (flippable) pixels is first identified, as in the shuffling approach. Then a set
of linear equations are established and solved to assign values to the k changeable
pixels. To establish the equation set, a pseudo-random binary matrix D that is
shared by the data embedder and detector is used. In the detection, the hidden
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data can be extracted using the simple matrix multiplication. In the following
subsections, we first present a detailed mathematical formulation applying WPC
embedding to binary images. We then evaluate the embedding payload, and draw






























Figure 4.1: Block diagram of the proposed binary image data hiding system em-
ploying the Wet Paper Coding.
4.2.1 Basic Embedding and Detection
Consider a cover binary image x consisting of n elements {xi}, i = 1, ..., n, xi ∈
{0, 1}. Among them, there are k flippable pixels {xj}, j ∈ C ⊂ {1, 2, ..., n} and
|C| = k. The embedded image y also consists of n pixels. The embedding may
change a flippable pixel (i.e., yj = 1 − xj), or leave it unmodified (i.e., yj = xj).
Consider the case of embedding q-bit data m = {m1, ...,mq} in x. A secret key
is used to generate a pseudo-random binary matrix D of dimensions q × n. The
flippable pixels {xj}, j ∈ C are then modified if needed so that the watermarked
binary image y satisfies
Dy = m. (4.1)
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Thus, the sender needs to solve a system of linear equations in GF(2) (in binary
arithmetic). In the detection, the hidden data m can be extracted by simply
performing a matrix multiplication m = Dy using the shared matrix D.
In the WPC scheme, the embedding obviously involves bigger computational
complexity because it requires solving a system of q linear equations in (4.1). One
approach to solving (4.1) with a lower computational complexity is to impose a
structure on the columns of matrix D to avoid having to solve the equations alto-
gether. For example, the apparatus of LT codes [59] can be used to generate the
columns of D so that their Hamming weight follows the “robust soliton distribu-
tion”. A modified LT process [28,30] can then be used to solve the system in (4.1)
efficiently. As discussed in [30], the modified LT process can also lead to a higher
embedding efficiency, which indicates the number of embedded bits per embedding
change. Improving on the embedding efficiency of the wet paper codes can also be
achieved by employing random linear codes of small codimension [31].
4.2.2 Embedding Payload
The maximal length of a message that can be communicated using wet paper codes
is related to the expected rank of the matrix D. Obviously, for small q, (4.1) will
have a solution with a very high probability and this probability decreases with
increasing q. Rewrite the equation set (4.1) as Dv = m − Dx using the vector
v = y−x. Corresponding to the n−k non-flippable pixels that the embedder must
keep unchanged, n − k elements of the v vector will be fixed as zeros. Therefore,
there are only k unknown vj, j ∈ C in (4.1), and we can remove from D the n− k
columns corresponding to the zero vi’s, i /∈ C. Keeping the same symbol for v, we
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now have
Hv = m − Dx, (4.2)
where H is a binary q × k matrix consisting of those columns of D corresponding
to indices C, and v is an unknown k× 1 binary vector. This system has a solution
for an arbitrary message m as long as rank(H) = q. Assume that we always try to
embed as many bits as possible by adding rows to D while maintaining that (4.2)
still has a solution. Let qmax be the expected maximum number of bits that can
be embedded in this manner given k flippable pixels. It has been shown that [28]
qmax = k + O(2
−k/4). (4.3)
This indicates that the embedding payload can approach the number of flippable
pixels, suggesting high utilization of flippable pixels and a potentially significant
gain in the embedding payload. It was also shown that the result in (4.3) still
holds when 1’s and 0’s in the random binary matrix H do not occur with the same
probability, and the density of 1’s in H can be as small as log2(k)/k [17, 28,29].
4.2.3 Relation to Block-based Embedding with Shuffling
Through random projections brought by the random matrix D in (4.1), the WPC
paradigm naturally handles the uneven embedding capacity in binary images.
Moreover, by jointly considering the embedding of multiple bits, it allows for a
high utilization of flippable pixels, thus can significantly improve the embedding
payload when compared with the shuffling approach.
Taking a closer look, we find that the block-based embedding with the shuffling
approach is actually a special case of the wet paper coding, where the random
projection matrix Dshuffle is highly structured with only one non-zero entry in
90
each column. This is because a block is the basic unit for hiding one message
bit and the blocks are mutually disjoint. As a result, each pixel is involved in the
embedding of only one message bit. Additionally, the randomness of the projection
matrix Dshuffle is brought in by the shuffling procedure.
In the WPC-based embedding, the random matrix D is defined in a more gen-
eral sense, which is actually a double-edge sword. On one hand, it allows a flippable
pixel to participate in the embedding of multiple message bits, thereby enabling
high utilization of flippable pixels. On the other hand, with a non-structured ran-
dom matrix D, more complex algorithms shall be involved in solving the equation
set Dx = m. As randomness appears in both methods and some secret information
is required to correctly detect the hidden data, both the shuffling and the WPC
schemes enhance the system security by making it difficult to perform tampering
while preserving the embedded data.
4.3 Fidelity Considerations for Binary Image Wa-
termarking
As the WPC based approach allows a much higher utilization of flippable pix-
els, the amount of pixels being flipped by the embedding process may also be
larger than in the shuffling based approach. When more pixels are flipped, even
though they are flippable ones, there may be a larger perceptual impact on the
watermarked binary image, especially for binary images containing objects that
a human observer expects to have a defined shape, such as fonts in text images.
To ensure imperceptibility of hidden data while maintaining a high embedding
payload, in this section, we propose a method of adaptive trimming to perform
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flippability assignment on individual pixels in a binary image, and also develop a
new concept of super-pixels to address the dependencies among the flippability of
a group of pixels.
4.3.1 Adaptive Trimming for Flippability Assignment
In the shuffling approach, a trimming step [90] is employed to ensure any 3 × 3
window has no more than one pixel with a high flippability score; and such a
trimming window can be enlarged to impose a more stringent constraint on the
minimum distance between flippable pixels for text images. However, this window
based trimming method does not take the image content into consideration, and
may largely reduce the number of high-scoring flippable pixels and therefore the
embedding rate. To achieve a better tradeoff between watermark imperceptibility
and the embedding rate, we propose an adaptive trimming approach to identify
high-scoring flippables that will be used in the embedding process in consideration
of the content of binary images.
According to smoothness and connectivity measures in [90], a flippability score
is assigned to each pixel. Among those with a high score {xj}, j ∈ C ′ ⊂ {1, 2, ..., n},
there are black pixels x
(0)
C′ = {xj : j ∈ C ′ ∧ xj = 0} that constitute the foreground,
as well as white pixels x
(1)
C′ = {xj : j ∈ C ′ ∧ xj = 1} that are somewhat further
away from the foreground. As shown in Fig. 4.2, flipping two pixels xa ∈ x(0)C′ and
xb ∈ x(1)C′ in the same neighborhood but with different colors generates artifacts
with high possibility, since the foreground pixel xa now becomes a white pixel while
its neighbor xb further away from the foreground is in black instead. To avoid such
irregularity, the final high-scoring flippables in the same neighborhood should be







Figure 4.2: A closer look at flippables: (a) zoomed-in view of character “A” in the
original image; (b) pixels with the highest flippability score, with those belonging
to x
(0)
C′ in black color and those belonging to x
(1)
C′ in orange color; (c) flipping two
highest-score pixels xa ∈ x(0)C′ and xb ∈ x(1)C′ , which are in the same neighborhood
but with different colors.
as follows.
Starting from pixels with the highest flippability score smax, we identify con-
nected components of them using an 8-connected neighborhood, and process each
connected component adaptively. For the ith connected component Ti,smax , we first
identify pixels that are originally black and white, T
(0)
i,smax
= {xj : xj = 0 ∧ xj ∈
Ti,smax} and T (1)i,smax = {xj : xj = 1∧xj ∈ Ti,smax}, respectively. Then, we determine
the final flippability score for pixels in the ith connected component according to




∣∣∣T (0)i,smax∣∣∣ and n(1)i,smax = ∣∣∣T (1)i,smax∣∣∣. If n(0)i,smax > n(1)i,smax ,








small score of sd is assigned to pixels in T
(0)
i,smax
, while the score of smax remains
for those in T
(1)
i,smax
. In this way, we ensure that final flippables with a score of
smax in the same neighborhood are in the same color while the number of them is
maximized. An example of such adaptive trimming for highest-score flippables is
given in Fig. 4.3.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.3: An example of adaptive trimming for highest-score flippables: (a)
highest-score flippables before adaptive trimming; (b) highest-score flippables after
adaptive trimming.
The adaptive trimming can be further carried out for a smaller flippability
score. Assume that we have identified pixels with a flippability score larger than
this current score s. As shown in Fig. 4.4(a), we first combine these identified
higher-scoring flippables with those of the current score s, and then find connected
components from this pixel combination. For each of the connected components,
we perform the following processing. Let Ti,≥s be the ith connected component,
in which Ti,s and Ti,>s contain its pixels of a score equal to s and larger than s,




i,s = {xj : xj = 0 ∧ xj ∈ Ti,s}
T
(1)






i,>s = {xj : xj = 0 ∧ xj ∈ Ti,>s}
T
(1)
i,>s = {xj : xj = 1 ∧ xj ∈ Ti,>s}
. (4.4)
After that, we adaptively assign flippability scores to pixels in Ti,s according to







∣∣∣T (0)i,>s∣∣∣ and n(1)i,>s = ∣∣∣T (1)i,>s∣∣∣.
If n
(0)
i,>s > 0 and n
(1)
i,>s = 0, it indicates that we have assigned high flippability
scores for pixels in T
(0)
i,>s, and therefore the score of t should remain for pixels in
T
(0)
i,s while a small score of sd is assigned to pixels in T
(1)





i,>s = 0, the score of s remains for pixels in T
(1)
i,s , and a small score of sd is
94
(a) (b)
Figure 4.4: An example of adaptive trimming for non-highest-score flippables: (a)
combine flippables with score 0.625 after adaptive trimming with those with score
0.375 before adaptive trimming; (b) flippables after adaptive trimming and with
score larger than or equal to 0.375.
assigned to those in T
(0)
i,s . If n
(1)
i,>s = 0 and n
(0)
i,>s = 0, it indicates that all pixels in
the ith connected component have a score of t, and we assign flippability scores as
above for the smax case. Finally, if n
(1)
i,>s > 0 and n
(0)
i,>s > 0, it indicates that one
or more pixels in Ti,s have connected pixels with a flippability score higher than s
but in different colors as a single connected component. To avoid the foreground-
background irregularity as discussed before, we assign a small score of sd to all
pixels in Ti,s in this case. With such adaptive trimming, we maximize the number
of flippable pixels with a higher score under the perceptual constraint of requiring
any two flippables in the same neighborhood be in the same color. An example of
flippables after the above adaptive trimming and with a score larger than 0.375 is
shown in Fig. 4.4(b). Additional trimming can be applied to the identified high-
scoring flippable pixels, such as using the rule that any two of them cannot be in
a 4-connected neighborhood.
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4.3.2 “Super-Pixels” for Group Flippability
When evaluating pixel flippability in binary images, the prior art generally focuses
on the flipping of individual pixels. However, in some types of binary images, such
as text documents, a group of pixels that may not be individually flippable can
be changed together without introducing visible artifacts, as shown in Fig. 4.5.
After being grouped as a single unit, a set of individually non-flippable pixels may
take a few number of patterns satisfying the perceptual quality requirement. This
provides the embedder more resources to manipulate for carrying the hidden data.
In our work, we refer to such a pixel set as a super-pixel [40], and propose to
incorporate it in the framework of wet paper coding to achieve a better tradeoff
between the embedding payload and the perceptual quality of watermarked binary
images.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4.5: Super-pixel example: (a) original text image; (b) zoomed-in view for
the lower part of the leftmost stroke in (a); (c) flipping an individually non-flippable
pixel below the bottom horizontal line in (b); (d) flipping a set of individually non-
flippables below the same horizontal line as in (c).
Problem Formulation: Given a cover binary image x consisting of n elements
{xi}, i = 1, · · · , n, xi ∈ {0, 1}, in addition to the k individually flippable pixels
{xj}, j ∈ C, we now have u super-pixels coming from those individually non-
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flippable pixels {xj}, j /∈ C. In order to utilize the super-pixel resources to further
increase the embedding payload, the embedder needs to determine values of the k
individually flippable pixels as well as identify one of the allowed patterns for each
of the u super-pixels so that the marked binary image y still satisfies Dy = m.
On the detector side, since blind detection is required, the hidden data m shall
still be extracted via the simple matrix multiplication m = Dy, without using the
original image and any information about both individually flippable pixels and
super-pixels.
Representing Super-Pixels as Regular Flippables: From the above problem
formulation, we can see that the main issue remains at the embedder side, which
needs to determine one of several patterns for each super-pixel. We solve this
problem by representing super-pixels as regular individual flippables.
Assume that the ith super-pixel consists of pi ≥ 2 black-white pixels and allows
si = 2
ti patterns satisfying the fidelity requirement, where ti < pi. To represent the
si patterns, we now can use ti bits, each of which can take either 0 or 1, just like a
regular flippable pixel. In this way, through the introduction of the ith super-pixel,
we transform pi individually non-flippable pixels to ti regular individual flippables.




Under the framework of wet paper coding, the pseudo-random matrix D is the
only information shared between the embedder and the detector, and the detector
shall be able to extract the q-bit hidden data m from the test image y via a simple
matrix multiplication m = Dy. However, when incorporating super-pixels in the
WPC-based embedding, the introduction of the ith super-pixel shall reduce pi indi-
vidually non-flippable pixels to ti flippables. Correspondingly, the pi columns in the
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pseudo-random matrix D for the pi non-flippables shall be reduced to ti columns
for the ti bits representing the i
th super-pixel. In order to support blind detection
at the detector side, such pixel and matrix reduction should be appropriately ex-
ecuted. Denote the above pi columns in D as a q × pi sub-matrix Dpi , and their
reduced ti columns as a q× ti matrix Dti . Also organize the si patterns that the ith
super-pixel can take as a pi × si matrix P (i) = [p1 p2 ... psi ], and their corre-
sponding ti-bit super-pixel representation as a ti × si matrix T (i) = [t1 t2 ... tsi ].




and this should hold true for each of the u super-pixels. After applying the above
reduction to all the u super-pixels, the original cover image x with n pixels becomes
a vector x(r) of n(r) = n −∑ui=1(pi − ti) elements, and the matrix D of size q × n
becomes D(r) of size q × n(r) .
In (4.5), the pseudo-random sub-matrix Dpi and the pattern set P
(i) are given,
while the reduced matrix columns Dti and the ti-bit pattern indices T
(i) are to
be determined. Since the pattern set P (i) is designed according to perceptual
properties of binary images, there may not be a solution to (4.5) in some cases.
One special situation is that T (i) can be chosen to satisfy a linear relationship with
P (i), i.e., there exists a binary matrix G(i) such that P (i) = G(i)T (i). By plugging
P (i) = G(i)T (i) into (4.5), we can easily identify Dti = DpiG
(i). A simple example
of this linear case is a super-pixel allowing two patterns of p1 = [0, 0, · · · , 0] and
p2 = [1, 1, · · · , 1]. The 1-bit indices of p1 and p2 can be determined as t1 = 0 and
t2 = 1, respectively, while the G
(i) matrix is an all 1 vector.
WPC-based Embedding with Super-Pixels: As shown in Fig. 4.6, there are
three main steps when implementing WPC-based embedding with super-pixels. In
98
Step-1, by representing super-pixels as regular flippables, we reduce the original
binary image x to x(r), and the pseudo-random matrix D to D(r), as discussed
above in Section 4.3.2. In Step-2, a set of equations are established over the
reduced x(r) and D(r) and solved to obtain a reduced marked vector y(r) satisfying
D(r)y(r) = m, using wet paper coding as discussed in Section 4.2. In Step-3, from
the reduced marked vector y(r) carrying the hidden data m, we reconstruct the
marked binary image y of the same size as the original image x. In the following, we
present some implementation details of Step-1 reduction and Step-3 reconstruction.
To facilitate these two operations, we establish a locating vector to record locations
of individual black-white pixels that are contained in each of the u super-pixels.
 x 








  y 
 D  D
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Figure 4.6: Diagram of WPC-based embedding with super-pixels.
Step-1 performs image and matrix reduction as follows. For the ith super-pixel
consisting of pi individual pixels and allowing 2
ti patterns, its ti-bit index as in
the original image x can be identified via looking up the index-pattern mapping
T (i)-P (i). Aided with the locating vector, we put this ti-bit index at the first ti
locations of the super-pixel, and mark the remaining pi − ti locations as “invalid”.
To perform matrix reduction, according to the locating vector, we first organize
the pi columns in D to obtain Dpi . Then, as discussed in Section 4.3.2, we reduce
Dpi to Dti of ti columns. After that, we replace the first ti columns of Dpi with Dti ,
and mark the remaining pi − ti columns as “invalid”. After the above processing
is finished for all the u super-pixels, “invalid” pixels in x and “invalid” columns in
D are repudiated to obtain x(r) and D(r), respectively. The reduced image vector
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x(r) has n−∑ui=1(pi − ti) pixels, among which k +∑ui=1 ti are flippables, ready for
the subsequent WPC-based embedding.
In Step-3, we have a reduced y(r) of n(r) = n−∑ui=1(pi−ti) pixels and satisfying
D(r)y(r) = m, and we need to reconstruct a marked image y with n pixels and
satisfying Dy = m. Among the n(r) pixels in y(r), WPC embedding may have
flipped some of the k +
∑u
i=1 ti flippables. Comparing y
(r) and the reduced cover
image x(r), we can easily identify the actual flippings, each of which originally may
be an individually flippable pixel or one element of a super-pixel index. For the
former, we identify the pixel location j in the original image x and then flip it to
obtain its value in the marked image y, i.e., y(j) = 1− x(j). For the latter, aided
with the locating vector, we first retrieve the whole index with ti bits. Then, we
find its corresponding pi-pixel group via the established index-pattern mapping,
and place the pixel group at its corresponding locations in y. Such reconstruction
is performed for all actual flippings, while the untouched pixels in y will be the
same as their counterparts in x.
4.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we provide experimental results on employing wet paper codes to
hide data in binary images. First, we demonstrate the embedding payload and
perceptual quality of marked binary images, with flippable pixels identified using
the proposed adaptive trimming method in Section 4.3.1. Then, we examine the
performance of incorporating super-pixels in the framework of wet paper coding
to further increase the embedding payload while preserving the perceptual quality
of watermarked binary images.
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4.4.1 Results with Adaptive Trimming
In the first test, the original binary image in Figure 4.7(a) consists of 48 × 288
pixels. Using adaptive trimming as discussed in Section 4.3.1, we identify 271 pixels
having the highest flippability score 0.625, and 447 pixels having a score greater
than 0.1. For comparison, the 3× 3 window trimming in [90] returns 250 pixels of
score 0.625 and 371 pixels with a score greater than 0.1. Figures 4.7(b)-(d) show
the watermarked images after embedding q = 54, 150, and 260 bits, respectively,
using wet paper coding. In the embedding, k = 271 flippable pixels are selected
as all pixels with the highest flippability score 0.625. Visually comparing the
watermarked images in Figures 4.7(b)-(d) with the original image in Figure 4.7(a),
we can see that the embedding of 54 and 150 bits does not introduce detectable
artifacts, while a few artifacts can be found through very careful observation in the
case of embedding 260 bits. Compared with the shuffling approach that embeds
one bit per 16 × 16 block for a total of 54 bits into this test image, the wet paper
coding allows a five-fold improvement in the embedding payload. Using the wet
paper coding, we can also easily accommodate different sizes of hidden data in
different applications.
In the second test, we use a binary map image as shown in Figure 4.8(a), which
consists of 321 × 321 pixels. After the adaptive trimming, this image returns
k = 2678 flippable pixels with a flippability score strictly above 0.1, among which
1539 pixels have the highest flippability score 0.625. For comparison, the 3 × 3
window trimming provides 1514 pixels of score 0.625 and 2116 pixels of score above
0.1. With the flippables identified via adaptive trimming, the WPC approach was
used to embed 1530 bits, and a marked map image is shown in Figure 4.8(b).




Figure 4.7: Results on applying WPC embedding to the Clinton’s Signature image:
(a) original Clinton’s signature, (b) 54 bits embedded, (c) 150 bits embedded, (d)
260 bits embedded.
the k = 1539 flippables. As a comparison, the embedding payload for the shuffling
approach is around 400 bits, which again suggests an almost five-fold improvement
in the embedding payload by the WPC based embedding.
In the last test, we crop a 200×410 area from a binary scanned text document
as the cover image, which is shown in Fig. 4.9(a). Using adaptive trimming, we
arrive at 892 pixels with score 0.625, 309 pixels with score 0.375, 35 pixel with
score 0.25, and 290 pixels with score 0.125. As a comparison, the 3 × 3 window
trimming identifies 792, 174, 35, and 196 pixels with score 0.625, 0.375, 0.25, and
0.125 respectively. For this example, adaptive trimming increases the number of
pixels with score 0.625 by 12.6%, and we select all of them as the k = 892 flippable
pixels in the embedding. In Figure 4.9(b), 880 bits are embedded using flippables
identified via adaptive trimming. Visually comparing Figures 4.9(a) and (b), we
can see that the watermarked image has good perceptual quality while hosting
a large embedding payload. Comparing with the shuffling approach which can
embed 320 bits when 16 × 16 blocks are used, we achieve an almost three-fold
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.8: The original and embedded binary map images: (a) original image; (b)
embedded with 1530 bits.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.9: The original and embedded text document images: (a) original image;
(b) embedded with 880 bits.
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improvement on the embedding payload when using the WPC based approach.
4.4.2 Results with “Super-Pixels”
Using the binary text document as shown in Fig. 4.9(a) as an example, we evaluate
the embedding payload and the perceptual quality of watermarked binary images
with super-pixels identified and incorporated under the framework of wet paper
coding. As presented in Section 4.4.1, the adaptive trimming provides us 892 pixels
with the highest flippability score 0.625 for this cover image, and we select all of
them as the k = 892 individually flippable pixels in the embedding. In Fig. 4.10(a)
and (b), we re-draw the cover image and show the 892 individually flippable pixels,
respectively. From Fig. 4.10(b), we can see that these individually flippable pixels
are located on the non-straight boundaries of the characters.
In Fig. 4.5 of Section 4.3.2, we have shown that a set of individually non-
flippable pixels along a straight boundary can be flipped together without affect-
ing the perceptual quality of text documents. Hence, as shown in Fig. 4.10(c), we
select 53 straight boundaries as our 53 super-pixels, after appropriate trimming
to separate each super-pixel from individually flippable pixels as well as other
super-pixels. Each of these 53 super-pixels can take two patterns, either all 1’s
or all 0’s. As discussed in Section 4.3.2, with such a pattern design, we can suc-
cessfully implement the image and matrix reduction before the wet paper coding.
Incorporating these 53 super-pixels in the WPC-based embedding in addition to
the 892 individually flippable pixels, we can further improve the embedding pay-
load. As each of the u = 53 super-pixels takes two patterns that can be indexed
by 1 bit, the total number of effective flippables is increased from k = 892 to





Figure 4.10: Experimental results with super-pixels: (a) original image; (b) individ-
ually flippable pixels shown as dark points; (c) straight boundaries as super-pixels
shown as dark lines; (d) marked image; (e) pixel-wise difference between (a) and
(d) shown as dark points/lines.
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is an additional increase of 5.9%.
In Fig. 4.10(d), we show a watermarked text document for the cover image in
Fig. 4.10(a), with q = 940 bits embedded using both the 892 individually flippable
pixels and the 53 super-pixels. Visually comparing these two images, we can see
that the embedding does not introduce annoying artifacts. The pixel-wise differ-
ence between the original image and the marked image is shown in Fig. 4.10(e).
Given the marked image in Fig. 4.10(d) and the shared pseudo-random matrix
D, the 942-bit hidden data can be accurately extracted via matrix multiplication,
without any information about either individual flippables or super-pixels.
(a) (b)
(d) (c)
Figure 4.11: Application to authenticating binary images: (a) a logo image as the
watermark; (b) a watermarked binary image with the logo embedded in; (c) a
tampered version of (b) with one digit changed as indicated by the arrow; (d) the
watermark extracted from the tampered binary image in (c).
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To demonstrate the application of WPC based embedding to authenticating
binary images, we take a 47× 20 binary logo image as shown in Fig. 4.11(a) as the
watermark. We then embed it into the original image as shown in Fig. 4.10(a), and
obtain a watermarked binary image as shown in Fig. 4.11(b). In the embedding,
we use both the 892 individually flippable pixels and the 53 super-pixels as the
k = 945 flippables. From this marked image in Fig. 4.11(b), the logo image can
be accurately extracted when the correct pseudo-random matrix D is available.
Acting as an attacker, we change one digit from “2” to “5” on the top row of
the marked text image, as indicated in Fig. 4.11(c). From this tampered binary
image and assuming the correct pseudo-random matrix D, we perform watermark
extraction again, but the matrix multiplication no longer returns a meaningful
logo image, but a meaningless random image as shown in Fig. 4.11(d). Because
integrity of the logo image has been violated, we can claim with high confidence
that the binary text image in Fig. 4.11(c) is a tampered image, although it is
perceptually good to our eyes.
4.5 Discussions on Watermark’s Robustness
In content-based authentication applications that distinguish malicious content
tampering from content-preserving processing, some level of resilience against noise
is desirable. In this section, we discuss the robustness of WPC-based data embed-
ding in binary images against minor processing and distortions, and also compare
it with the shuffling approach.
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4.5.1 Analytic Results
In order to obtain analytic insights on the robustness of WPC-based watermarks
on binary images, we consider a simplified distortion model, where some pixels of
a marked image are randomly flipped due to noise. Reliable extraction of hidden
data under such distortion is possible if we apply appropriate error correcting
coding (ECC) to the data payload before embedding into the host image. In the
following, we first examine the raw error probability before error correcting, as it
provides a guideline on selecting what ECC to use. We then analyze the achievable
payload that can be reliably conveyed using the WPC-based embedding.
Raw Error Probability: To model the pseudo-random binary matrix D in
the WPC approach, we assume its elements to be i.i.d. realizations of a random
variable that is 1 with probability δ and 0 with probability 1 − δ, where δ =
log2(k)/k is the density of D matrix as discussed before. When m pixels in the
marked image are flipped due to noise, we analyze how many message bits will be
incorrectly extracted. We note that the ith message bit is extracted as XOR of
pixels whose indices are determined by 1’s in the ith row of D. Thus, it is extracted
as incorrect if and only if there are an odd number of noise-flipped pixels among








⎟⎠ δ2k+1(1 − δ)m−(2k+1) = 1 − (1 − 2δ)m
2
. (4.6)
We can see that for the same number of noise-flipped pixels (as quantized by m),
a smaller density δ will have a smaller probability of error. For small δ, we can
also approximate P (δ) to be mδ.
For comparison, we also analyze the error probability of the shuffling method.
Using analysis similar to those in [90], we can calculate the mean value of the
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where μr is the number of blocks each having exactly r noise-flipped pixels, q =
n/B is the number of blocks (also the message size) with B being the block size
and n being the total number of pixels, and m is the number of noise-flipped pixels.
Since each odd-valued r will bring 1-bit message error, the message bit error rate










As the block-based embedding with the shuffling approach is a special case of wet
paper encoding as discussed earlier, we can also derive its bit error rate using (4.6)
with the density δ = B/n. Because B/n is generally smaller than log2(k)/k, which
is the density of the random matrix D in the WPC approach, it is expected that
the shuffling approach has a smaller bit error rate than the general WPC approach.
Achievable Payload: Since WPC-based embedding allows many more bits to
be embedded, we can use a stronger ECC code to correct bit errors. As such,
it is possible that the actual payload to be reliably conveyed by WPC becomes
higher than the shuffling based approach. An upper bound on the achievable
payload can be established through modeling the erroneous channel as a binary
symmetric channel (BSC) and examining its Shannon channel capacity. According
to information theory [18], a BSC channel with cross-over probability p can reliably
convey up to 1−h(p) bit per channel use, where h(p) = −p log2(p)−(1−p) log2(1−
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p). Then, the actual payload can be calculated through multiplying 1 − h(p) by
the number of channels available. In our problem, the cross-over error probabilities
for the WPC and shuffling approaches are given in (4.6) and (4.8), respectively.
4.5.2 Simulation Results
Using the Clinton’s signature as an example, we first compare the raw error prob-
ability of the WPC and shuffling approaches. For the WPC approach, the matrix
density is δ = log2(k)/k, where k = 271, and a total of 260 bits are embedded; for
the shuffling approach, the block size is B = 256, the number of blocks is q = 54,
and the equivalent matrix density is 1/54. The analytic results of the message bit
error rate after randomly flipping m pixels are shown in Figure 4.12(a), along with
the simulation results from 100 random realizations. We can see that the analysis
and simulation agree very well. At the settings given here, the shuffling based ap-
proach appears to have a smaller bit error rate than the WPC. It is true for both
approaches that the lower the density of D, the lower the error rate. However, the
low density may adversely affects the solvability. For the shuffling approach, the
low matrix density may violate the requirement of having at least one flippable per
block. For the WPC approach, when the matrix density decreases below log2(k)/k,
the probability of finding a solution to (4.2) quickly decreases.
After obtaining the raw error probabilities, we further calculate the achievable
payload for the signature image using the shuffling and the WPC approaches. In
our case, the number of channels is the number of bits embedded in the binary
image, which is 54 for the shuffling approach and 260 for the WPC embedding,
respectively. As we can see from Figure 4.12(b), the proposed data hiding approach
for binary images based on WPC is capable of reliably conveying more bits than
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the shuffling based approach when the amount of noise/distortion is moderate.

















































Figure 4.12: Robustness comparison of the shuffling and WPC based approach:
(a) raw error probability; (b) achievable payload.
4.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have investigated the incorporation of a recent steganography
framework, wet paper coding, for high-payload and high-fidelity data embedding
in binary images. The wet paper codes naturally handle the uneven embedding
capacity through randomized projections. As opposed to the previous shuffling-
based approach, where only a small portion of the flippable pixels are actually
utilized in the embedding, the wet paper codes allow for a high utilization of
pixels that have high flippability score for embedding, thus giving a significantly
improved embedding payload than the previous approach. In order to preserve
the perceptual quality of watermarked binary images under the high embedding
payload, we have proposed an adaptive trimming method to perform flippability
assignment on individual pixels in a binary image, and also developed a new con-
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cept of super-pixels to address the dependencies among the flippability of a group
of pixels. We have demonstrated on several representative images that the pro-
posed technique provides a large enhancement on the embedding payload while
achieving high perceptual quality for watermarked images. We also analyze and
compare the watermark’s robustness of the new WPC-based approach with the
shuffling approach, and reveal the tradeoff between the embedding payload, prob-
lem solvability, and watermark robustness.
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Chapter 5
Intrinsic Sensor Features for
Scanner Forensics
While cameras provide digital reproduction of natural scenes, scanners are often
used to capture hard-copy art in more controlled environment and have become a
major kind of apparatus to transform graphic data into the digital domain. In this
chapter, we propose a new technique of utilizing intrinsic sensor noise features for
non-intrusive scanner forensics to verify the source and integrity of digital scanned
images. Using only scanned image samples, we analyze scanning noise from several
aspects, including through image de-noising, wavelet analysis, and neighborhood
prediction, and then obtain statistical features from each characterization. Based
on the proposed statistical features of scanning noise, we construct a robust scanner
identifier to determine the model of the scanner used to capture a scanned image.
Utilizing these noise features, we further broaden the scope of acquisition forensics
to differentiating scanned images from camera taken images and computer gener-
ated images. The proposed noise features also enable integrity forensic analysis
on scanned images, including detecting post-processing and stegonagraphy opera-
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tions on scanned images. Through experimental results, we demonstrate that the
proposed method can identify the correct scanner model with high accuracy and
with strong robustness against a number of post-processing operations on scanned
images. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of employing the proposed noise
features for performing various forensic analysis on scanned images.
5.1 Introduction
Scanners are a major kind of apparatus to transfer graphic data on paper hard-
copies to the digital domain. Such a transfer is of utmost importance in the modern
information era, as it provides an essential means to facilitate maintenance and
sharing of various graphic data. Electronic filing cabinets have been introduced
in many companies and commercial establishments as a modern way to handle
otherwise paper documents1. Banks and financial agencies are moving towards
paperless solutions in their everyday operations. One recent advancement is the
legislation of the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21) [1], which was
adopted as part of the e-banking initiative in 2004. This legislation allows banks to
exchange scanned check images rather than physical checks, and use the scanned
version as the record to authorize electronic fund transfer from one account to
another2. As scanned check images can be electronically transmitted across the
world in minutes, Check 21 can significantly reduce check processing costs as well
as increase business efficiency. The benefits of fast transmission and convenient
processing of scanned check images also give rise to new kinds of attacks. Anal-




domain processing techniques to alter check images, such as changing the payee
and the monetary amount. Therefore, it has become particularly important in
these cases to ensure the images after scanning are not further tampered.
Traditional methods for image authentication include digital signature based
on public-key encryption, robust image hashing [79], and fragile digital watermark-
ing [26]. In digital signature based authentication, a key-based hash is computed
from the digital image and then transmitted along with it. If tampering has hap-
pened to the digital image, it can be detected by verifying if the attached digital
signature matches the one generated from the test image [94]. The change of
even a single bit (e.g., due to transmission errors) may return a totally different
digital signature. Content based robust image hashing schemes [79] generate im-
age hashes resilient to content-preserving operations, which addresses the fragility
issue of conventional hashing and can be used as robust digital signatures for im-
age authentication. In watermarking based verification techniques as discussed in
Chapter 4, pre-defined patterns or content features are seamlessly embedded into
the digital image through slightly modifying its pixel values. The above encryp-
tion/watermarking module needs to be implemented inside the image capturing
device. This imposes restrictions on its usage in authentication of scanned images,
as many scanners in the market do not have such capabilities. Complementary to
these existing techniques, there is a strong need to devise non-intrusive forensic
methods for verifying the source and integrity of digital scanned images by using
only scanned image samples.
While a growing amount of signal processing research is devoted to the security
and protection of multimedia data, forensic research on image acquisition devices
is still in its infancy. To our best knowledge, this is one of the first efforts to
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perform comprehensive source and integrity forensic analysis on scanned images.
The related prior works fall into two categories. In the first category, there are a
few works on non-intrusive forensic analysis of digital cameras, and some of them
have been employed to perform tampering detection on images captured by dig-
ital cameras. Component forensics was introduced as a methodology for forensic
analysis [81], where the authors have shown that the parameters obtained from
camera modelling, such as the color filter array (CFA) pattern and color interpo-
lation coefficients, can be used to construct a camera identifier to determine the
brand/model of the camera used to capture a photographic image. Based on such
a camera identifier, the work in [80] detects multi-segment slicing tampering by
assuming that different segments in a doctored image come from different cameras.
In [73], specific correlations introduced by CFA interpolation are quantified, and an
image region is identified as a tampered region if it lacks this specific correlation.
Being an essential algorithm inside most digital cameras, the CFA interpolation is
also utilized in [8] for classifying three different camera models. As we shall see in
Section 5.2, scanners capture color information in a different way without using the
CFA interpolation. Therefore, the above techniques for identifying digital cameras
cannot be directly extended to identifying scanners. In [60–62], pattern noise asso-
ciated with camera sensors is employed as a unique identifier of each camera, and
further for detecting image forgeries, in which a tampered region may be copied
from another region in the same image, or in a different image taken by either
other cameras or the same camera at different times. Such pattern noise functions
as a spread spectrum watermark unique to individual cameras, and its presence
in a digital photograph is determined using a correlation detector. Because the
correlation detector is highly sensitive to de-synchronization caused by geometric
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distortions, which are inherent in the scanning process, extending this technique
to scanner identification needs to address such de-synchronization issue carefully.
In the second category of related prior works, classifier based approaches were
proposed to detect image tampering [5,23] and/or to perform blind steganalysis on
images [6,24]. Finding suitable features is the key point of these classifier based ap-
proaches. In [5,6], features are calculated as a set of suitably chosen image quality
metrics evaluated between an input image and its filtered version using a low-pass
Gaussian filter. In [23, 24], multiple level wavelet decomposition is applied to the
input image, and then one set of features is obtained as the 1st ∼ 4th order mo-
ments of wavelet coefficients in individual subbands. Employing a linear predictor
to capture correlations that exist across orientation, space, and scale, an additional
set of features is computed from the 1st ∼ 4th order moments of prediction errors.
The above features in prior works may be employed to performing forensic analysis
on scanned images. However, our testing with those features shows a very limited
performance in identifying sources of scanned images. This is because that the
features used in these prior works are extracted without specifically taking the
scanning process and properties into consideration.
Concurrently with our work, the pattern noise introduced in [60, 62] for iden-
tifying individual cameras has been utilized in [48] to identify individual scanner
sets. Certain statistical features of the pattern noise are extracted and then feed
into a support vector machine to classify individual scanners. An overall classi-
fication accuracy of 96% is reported in [48] for identifying four scanners, among
which two are of the same model. The pattern noise features in [48] have also been
extended in [49] to differentiate scanned images from camera taken images. How-
ever, scanned images samples in [48,49] are generated using the native resolutions
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of the scanners, which are barely used in practice due to the long time of image
capturing and the huge size of the resulted scanned images.
In this work, we introduce a novel technique to establish the trust-worthiness
of scanning devices and scanned images. In our test, we focus on flat-bed scanners
which are one of the most popularly used classes of scanners. Based on a detailed
study of the imaging process in digital scanners, we extract informative sensor
noise features from scanned image samples for verifying their source and integrity.
Specifically, we analyze scanning noise from several angles including through image
de-noising, wavelet analysis, and neighborhood prediction, and then obtain statis-
tical features from each characterization. Building upon these statistical noise
features, we first construct a robust scanner identifier to determine the model of
the scanner used to capture individual scanned images, by using only scanned
image samples. Such a non-intrusive system would provide acquisition forensic
information useful for law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and facilitate se-
cure e-banking solutions in financial systems. Utilizing the proposed statistical
noise features, we further broaden the scope of acquisition forensics to different
types of image acquisition apparatus by differentiating scanned images from cam-
era taken images and computer generated images. Finally we perform integrity
forensic analysis on scanned images using the noise features, including detecting
post-processing operations after scanning, and conducting steganalysis on scanned
images.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we introduce the
basic scanner model and discuss scanning noise that forms a unique characteristic of
individual scanner models. Section 5.3 elaborates the extraction of statistical noise
features from scanned images. In Section 5.4, we present experimental results on
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scanner model identification as well as the further acquisition and integrity forensic
analysis on scanned images, using the features extracted in Section 5.3. Finally,
we summarize this chapter in Section 5.5.
5.2 Scanner Model and Scanning Noise
Fig. 5.1 shows the scanning system of a flat-bed scanner [33]. The system consists
of hardware devices that include a scanner head and a motion system, and software
algorithms that process and combine sensed data into an output image file. The
scanner head contains hardware components for generating a signal corresponding
to a thin horizontal strip of the hard-copy original, including a lamp, mirrors,
optical lens, color filters, color sensors, and electronic devices. The thin strip is
illuminated by the lamp, and its reflected light goes through the lens and further
through a trilinear color filter array consisting of red, green, and blue (RGB) filters,
respectively. The red, green, and blue light exposures are then captured by the
corresponding red, green, and blue CCD (charge-coupled device) sensors. As the
three exposures captured by the CCD sensors at a given time are for three parallel
raster lines with slightly different offsets in the thin horizontal strip, two of them
are buffered until all three colors of individual raster lines are captured. Further,
the exposure voltages recorded by CCDs for the three colors are amplified, and
then converted to digital values through an analog/digital converter. Driven by a
motion system, the scanner head moves from the top of the hard-copy document to
its bottom, scans it line-by-line, and captures the three color components (RGB)
for all horizontal rows into the digital domain. Corresponding to this line-by-line
scanning pattern, the resolution of a scanner contains two parameters, namely, a
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Figure 5.1: The basic model of a scanning system.
of the trilinear structure, and a vertical resolution indicating the step-size of the
motion system. Finally, the captured digital RGB values undergo post-processing
operations carried out by software algorithms, such as color transformation and
white balancing, to create the final scanned image.
As two major devices for acquiring digital images, scanners and digital cam-
eras share a considerable amount of similarities, and also differ in several aspects in
imaging process. Both scanners and digital cameras use color filters and CCD sen-
sors as basic elements of capturing color values of the objects to be imaged; they
also have similar A/D converters and post-processing operations such as color
transformation and white balancing. Several main differences between scanners
and digital cameras are highlighted in Table 5.1. The most notable one is the dif-
ferent geometries in which the CCD sensors are organized. Scanners use trilinear
CCDs corresponding to red, green, and blue components (as shown in Fig. 5.2(a)),
while digital cameras use a 2-D periodic CCD array, such as the well-known Bayer
CFA pattern shown in Fig. 5.2(b). Using the trilinear CCD array along with the
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Table 5.1: Comparison between scanners and digital cameras.
Scanner Camera
Data source Hard-copy art Physical scene/object
Light source High-intensity artificial light Natural or scene light augmented with flash
Acquisition geometry One raster line at a time Capture entire 2-D scene in one shot
Color acquisition
Trilinear CCD to capture nu-
merous full-colored pixels per
line, with hundreds or thousands
of lines per image
Square CCD array to capture numerous
single-colored pixels per image according
to CFA pattern (then interpolate to obtain
full-colored pixels)
(a) (b)
Figure 5.2: CCD sensor patterns in scanners and digital cameras: (a) Trilinear
CCD pattern in scanners, (b) Bayer color filter array pattern used in digital cam-
eras.
line-by-line acquisition mode enabled by the motion system, scanners can directly
capture all the three color components of each raster line. On the contrary, digital
cameras use a square CCD array to capture the entire 2-D scene in one shot. Be-
cause each CCD sensor can measure only the value of one color component, color
interpolation is required to obtain the other two color components. Serving as a
critical step in the imaging process of digital cameras, color interpolation coeffi-
cients have been used in the literature [8, 81] to classify different camera models.
However, as described above, color interpolation is not used in the scanning and
thus would not be a good feature in classifying different scanner models.
To identify features suitable for this new task, we resort to one inherent phe-
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nomenon of scanning: the noise effect. During the scanning process, light reflected
from the hard-copy original is recorded by CCD sensors, and then converted to
digital values. Quantitatively, the amount of reflected light is proportional to
the number of photoelectrons captured by a CCD sensor per time period, which
is then converted to an analog CCD voltage. Due to the discrete and random
nature of photoelectrons, several kinds of noise occur when photoelectrons are cre-
ated, including random shot noise, dark signal non-uniformity (DSNU), and photo
response non-uniformity (PRNU) [43]. The DSNU represents pixel-to-pixel vari-
ations in the CCD voltage when no light is incident on the CCD sensors, while
the PRNU models the variations under a fixed-intensity light. When the voltage
values stored in CCD sensors are read out, additional reset noise occurs. Voltage
amplification further introduces white noise and 1/f noise whose power spectrum
is a function of the inverse of the frequency f . Possible imperfections in the optical
system, such as deficiency or spectral peaks in the light source and light intensity
fluctuation, may also bring in noise.
Some types of noise in the scanning process can be mitigated to some de-
gree [33]. For instance, to compensate for DSNU, a short scan is done with the
scanner’s light off or blocked, and then the dark voltages are recorded. These
estimated dark voltages represent DC offsets, and therefor can be added to or
subtracted from voltages recoded in future scanning operations. PRNU can be
measured using a test scan of a built-in, calibrated target strip, with gain factors
obtained through comparing measured voltages with their expected values for the
target strip. These gain factors can then be used to compensate for the PRNU to
some extent for future scans. Effects of random noise in the scanning process can
be reduced by using better mirrors/lens, adopting a brighter light source, and/or
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by increasing exposure time. However, due to the inherent random nature of noise,
some amount of noise always persists even after noise compensation and reduction,
leaving intrinsic information for forensic analysis on scanners and scanned images.
In our work, we characterize the scanning noise from a statistical perspective,
and further utilize these statistical features to verify the source and integrity of
scanned images. Although there are several sources of scanning noise and different
kinds of noise have different properties, eventually they all appear as variations in
pixel values of scanned images, reflecting intrinsic information of scanner models.
Therefore, we characterize these pixel variations without separating the PRNU
and DSNU from other kinds of scanning noise. For a single scanner, when specific
values of these pixel variations may be changing from scan to scan due to random-
ness of the scanning noise and/or geometric distortions in the scanning process,
their statistical characteristics are expected to be stable for different scans. For
the same scanner model, as the same hardware devices and software solutions are
employed for its individual sets, the statistical characteristics of the scanning noise
are also expected to be stable for different scanner sets of the same model. On the
other hand, considering the tradeoff between production cost and scanner qual-
ity, different scanner models may use hardware devices of different quality, and/or
employ different methods to mitigate scanning noise, and therefore the statistical
characteristics of the scanning noise are expected to be different for different scan-
ner models. Based on the above analysis, we extract statistical features of scanning
noise to identify scanner models. Considering that images produced by cameras or
computer programs contain noise of different amounts and properties from scanned
images, we also expect the statistical noise features would help on differentiating
scanned images from camera taken images and computer generated images. If
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scanned images directly output from scanners are modified to carry stego informa-
tion or go through certain post-processing operations, such as low-pass filtering,
scaling, and rotation as possibly involved in tampering a scanned image, with a
high probability the intrinsic statistical noise features of the original scanned im-
ages shall be altered. Therefore, it is also promising to employ these statistical
noise features for such integrity forensic analysis as detecting post-processing after
scanning and performing steganalysis on scanned images.
5.3 Proposed Statistical Feature Extraction
In this section, we discuss how to extract statistical features of scanning noise that
can be used for identifying the scanner model source and verifying the integrity of
scanned images. We statistically characterize the scanning noise from the following
three aspects [34, 35]. First, we apply different denoising algorithms to scanned
images, and then obtain their noise part for feature extraction. Second, we focus
on histograms of wavelet coefficients at the finest scale, where the histogram shape
can be changed by scanning noise. Finally, we study the relationship between each
pixel and its eight neighbors, which also reflects the effect of scanning noise to
some extent.
5.3.1 Features from Denoising Algorithms
To extract statistical features of scanning noise, we first utilize image denoising
algorithms. As shown in Fig. 5.3, given a scanned image I, denoising operation
is applied to obtain its denoised version ID. The scanning noise nS at the pixel
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Figure 5.3: Statistical noise feature extraction by using denoising algorithms.
Statistical properties of the estimated noise {nS(i, j)} can then be used as features.
In our test, we use the absolute value of scanning noise, take log2 transformation,
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, (5.1)
where M and N indicate the size of the scanned image.
To capture various kinds of noise in the scanning process, we apply multiple
image denoising algorithms to the scanned image. In our work, we employ four
denoising algorithms: spatial linear filtering with an averaging filter, spatial linear
filtering with a Gaussian filter, spatial median filtering, and Wiener adaptive image
denoising algorithm. A low-pass linear filtering using averaging or Gaussian filters
helps model the high-frequency noise, a non-linear median filtering addresses the
“salt and pepper” noise, and adaptive methods such as Wiener filtering and those
in [14, 67] can tailor noise removal to the local pixel variance. Below we present
some details of the donoising algorithms used in our work.
(i) Linear filtering with averaging and Gaussian filters: Given a scanned
image I and a linear average/Gaussian filter h, the denoised image ID can be
obtained by correlating the filter h with the scanned image I appropriately. The
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value of a pixel in the denoised image ID is computed as a weighted sum of its
neighboring pixels and itself in the original scanned image I, with the neighborhood






h(k, l)I(i + k, j + l). (5.2)
where the filter size is L×L with L an odd number. In our test, we use an average
filter haverage of size 3× 3, and a Gaussian low-pass filter hGaussian of the same size































In average/Gaussian linear filtering, because of the low-pass filtering effect, local
variations caused by scanning noise can be reduced to some extent.
(ii) Median filtering based denoising: Median filtering is similar to using a
linear filter, as the value of a pixel in the denoised image ID is also determined based
on the pixel values of its neighborhood in the original scanned image I. However,
in median filtering, the pixel value is set to the median of its neighborhood pixels,
rather than a weighted sum. Let the median filter be with size L × L, we have
ID(i, j) = median {I(k, l), k ∈ [i−L/2, i+L/2], l ∈ [j−L/2, j+L/2]} . (5.3)
Using order statistics, median filtering is robust to extreme values, and therefore
able to extract out the outliers in scanned images. The median filtering method
helps model the “salt and pepper” noise. The value of L = 3 in our experiments.
(iii) Wiener adaptive image denoising: Wiener denoising performs pixel-
wise adaptive filtering based on statistics estimated from a local neighborhood of
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each pixel. For a pixel I(i, j), its local mean and variance are first estimated from
















(I(i + k, j + l) − μ̂(i, j))2 .
These estimated local mean and variance are then used to obtain a denoised pixel
value ID(i, j) through the following adaptive filtering:
ID(i, j) = μ̂(i, j) +
σ̂2(i, j) − σ̂2n
σ̂2(i, j)
(I(i, j) − μ̂(i, j)), (5.4)
where σ̂2n is an estimate of the noise variance, and can be computed as the average







2(i, j). In our test, we
choose two neighborhood sizes L = 3, 5 for Wiener denoising.
In summary, we perform average filtering, Gaussian filtering, median filtering,
and Wiener filtering (with two different neighborhood sizes) to a scanned image
to obtain five of its denoised versions. For each of the five denoised version, we
extract the two features in equation (5.1) from each of the three color components
(RGB), and therefore arrive at a total of 5 × 3 × 2 = 30 features from the image
denoising aspect.
5.3.2 Features from Wavelet Analysis
In this sub-section, we characterize scanning noise through wavelet analysis. Af-
ter one stage of 2-D wavelet decomposition [63], an input image is decomposed
to be four subbands, namely, low-low (LL), low-high (LH), high-low (HL), and
high-high (HH) subbands. Among these four subbands, the LL subband contains
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low-frequency components, while the other three are for high-frequency compo-
nents. In literature, it has been observed that for a large class of images, the
wavelet coefficients in LH, HL, and HH subbands do not follow a Gaussian distri-
bution [14,15,75]. This is because the spatial structure of these images consists of
smooth areas interspersed with occasional edges, and therefore coefficients in the
high-frequency subbands are sharply peaked at zero with broad tails. However,
because of the presence of scanning noise, we observe that high-frequency wavelet
coefficients of scanned images may approach Gaussian distributions. In Fig. 5.4(b),
we plot the histogram of the wavelet coefficients in the HH subband of the blue
color component for the digital photograph in Fig. 5.4(a). For comparison, the
histograms for its corresponding scanned images from an Epson Perfection 2450
photo scanner, and a Canon CanoScan D1250U2F scanner are shown in Fig. 5.4(c)
and (d), respectively. When generating each of these histograms, we normalize the
corresponding image to have an unit energy before the wavelet decomposition. For
each histogram, we also plot its Gaussian fitting shown as red curves in the figures,
whose mean and variance are set as the sample mean and the sample variance of
the subband coefficients. We observe that the histogram for the digital photograph
cannot be well approximated by Gaussian distributions, while those for scanned
images indeed approach Gaussian distributions. Further, we notice that different
scanner models produce scanning noise of different variances and affect goodness of
the Gaussian fitting to different extents, which are then expected to be beneficial
in identifying scanner models.
Based on above observations, we extract statistical noise features in the wavelet
domain as follows. Given a scanned image I, we first normalize it to be Ĩ with
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Figure 5.4: Histograms of wavelet coefficients in the HH1 subband for the blue
component: (a) a sample photograph; (b) histogram for the sample photograph;
(c) histogram for the scanned image output from an Espon Perfection 2450 photo
















Then, we perform one stage 2-D wavelet decomposition to Ĩ and obtain its three
high-frequency subbands HH, HL, LH. After that, for each of these three






















where U and V are the size of the wavelet subband, and we take σY as our third
statistical noise feature of image I,
f (3)(I) = σY . (5.6)
With the calculated sample mean μY and sample variance σ
2
Y , we arrive at a
Gaussian distribution N(μY , σ
2
Y ), and further quantify the goodness of fitting this
Gaussian distribution to the distribution of subband wavelet coefficients {Y (u, v)}.
Let p(y) and q(y) denote the probability density functions (PDFs) of the Gaus-
sian distribution N(μY , σ
2
Y ) and the distribution of subband wavelet coefficients
{Y (u, v)}, respectively. We quantify the goodness of Gaussian fitting by measuring




In our implementation, we approximate this integration by discrete summation to
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Figure 5.5: Statistical noise feature extraction via wavelet analysis.
where i is the index of histogram bins, Δy is the length of each bin, p(yi) is the
value of Gaussian PDF p(y) at the center of the ith bin, and q(yi) is the count of
the ith bin normalized toward a valid PDF such that
∑
i q(yi)Δy = 1.
In Fig. 5.5, we summarize the basic modules of extracting statistical noise
features via wavelet analysis. After performing pixel value normalization as in
Eqn. (5.5), we apply wavelet decomposition to each color component of a scanned
image, and then extract two features (standard deviation of wavelet coefficients
and goodness of Guassian fitting) from each of the three high-frequency subbands.
Therefore, a total of 3 × 2 × 3 = 18 features are obtained in the wavelet domain.
5.3.3 Features from Neighborhood Prediction
Most images consist of some smooth regions, where pixel values can be predicted
from certain neighboring pixels with high accuracy. However, because of the effect
of scanning noise, the smooth regions in scanned images may be contaminated,
resulting in a non-trivial error in the neighborhood prediction. As scanning noise
may vary from one scanner model to another scanner model, such noise variation
may be reflected by the difference in the neighborhood prediction error as discussed
above. In this subsection, we characterize the scanning noise in terms of the
neighborhood prediction error in the smooth regions, and then extract statistical
noise features from it.
Given a scanned image I, we identify its smooth regions based on local image
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gradient values. As in Section 5.3.2 for wavelet analysis, we first normalize I to be
Ĩ with unit energy in (5.5). Then, for pixels in the normalized Ĩ, we calculate their
horizontal/vertical gradient values gh and gv using linear filtering with Prewitt





























Comparing the gradient values with a threshold tg, we identify pixels in smooth
regions as those with both a small horizontal gradient and a small vertical gradient,
i.e.,
(i, j) ∈ smooth region, if (gh(i, j) ≤ tg) ∧ (gv(i, j) ≤ tg) .
Observing that scanning noise varies in dark and bright areas, we further partition
the identified pixels into two regions: a smooth dark region and a smooth bright
region, by setting a threshold ti on the pixel intensity values. In our experiments,
we set the gradient threshold tg = 0.2 and the intensity threshold ti as the median
of all the pixel intensity values in the normalized Ĩ.
For each of the two regions, we now perform neighborhood prediction as follows.
For each pixel bi in a given smooth region, we predict its value using a linear model






where ai,k is the pixel value of the eight neighbors as indicated in Fig. 5.6, and
xk ≥ 0 is the weight associated with each of the eight neighbors. We constrain the
weights to be non-negative numbers, with the aim of modelling positive correlation
between individual pixels with their neighbor pixels. To facilitate discussions, we
denote non-negative weight coefficients for each of the two regions as a column
vector x = [x1, x2, . . . , x8]
T , and represent its Q pixel values as a column vector
b = [b1, b2, . . . , bQ]
T . Each of these Q pixels has eight neighbors that can be
represented as a row vector ai = [ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,8], and all of these row vectors can
be organized as a matrix A of size Q× 8. Now we can formulate the estimation of
weight coefficients x as a non-negative least-squares (NNLS) problem
min
x
‖Ax − b‖2, subject to xk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , 8, (5.9)
The non-negative weight coefficients x can be found using the NNLS algorithm
described in [54], whose major points are summarized in Appendix 5.6. After we
obtain the weight coefficients x, we calculate the prediction vector b̂ = Ax with
respect to the original pixel value vector b.
a i,1 a i,4 a i,6
a i,2 b i a i,7
a i,3 a i,5 a i,8
Figure 5.6: The neighborhood of bi in the linear prediction model.
After obtaining the neighborhood predictions, we calculate the errors between
the predicted values and the original values, and finally extract certain statistics of
the errors as our noise features. Specifically, we calculate the absolute prediction
error
Δb = |b̂ − b| = |Ax − b|, (5.10)
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In Fig. 5.7, we summarize the basic modules of extracting statistical noise fea-
tures via neighborhood prediction. First, we identify pixels in a bright smooth
region and a dark smooth region, respectively, according to their intensity and
gradient values. Then, for pixels in each of the two regions, we perform neighbor-
hood prediction, and calculate the absolute prediction error. Finally, we extract
the mean and the standard deviation of the absolute prediction error as statistical
noise features. We apply the same procedure to all the three color components,
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Figure 5.7: Statistical noise feature extraction via neighborhood prediction.
5.4 Experimental Results and Forensic Applica-
tions
In this section, we present experimental results to demonstrate the performance
of utilizing the proposed statistical noise features for identifying the source and
integrity of scanned images. From each of the images in the test, we extract a total
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of 30+18+12 = 60 statistical noise features as discussed in Section 5.3, then apply
principle component analysis (PCA) [22] to these extracted features, and finally
feed them as inputs to a support vector machine (SVM) called LIBSVM [13] for
different identification/verification purposes. In the following, we will first briefly
review the SVM classifier with some implementation details. Then, we present
results on identifying scanner model sources using the statistical noise features.
After that, we broaden the scope of image source identification to differentiating
scanned images from camera taken and computer generated images. After that, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of using the statistical noise features for identifying
post-processing operations and performing blind steganalysis on scanned images.
Finally, we compare the proposed scheme with existing works in performing various
forensic analysis on scanned images.
5.4.1 Constructing Classifier via Support Vector Machines
Support vector machines provide a powerful tool for data classification. Given a set
of training samples, each with l features and a class label, the SVM constructs and
solves an optimization problem that maximizes the separate margin among differ-
ent classes formed by the given training samples. Those training samples that the
margin pushes up against are called support vectors. Such an optimization prob-
lem can be tackled via solving a dual quadratic problem that involves certain kernel
functions. Some examples of kernel functions include linear, polynomial, radial ba-
sis function (RBF), and sigmoid kernels. Utilizing non-linear kernels aims at mak-
ing linearly non-separable samples separable in the transformed non-linear space.
In our experiments, we use ν-support vector classification [13] with the non-linear
RBF kernel. The parameter ν ∈ (0, 1] in the ν-support vector classification pro-
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vides an upper bound on the fraction of training errors, and needs appropriate tun-
ing in practical use. The RBF kernel is defined as K(xi, xj) = exp(−γ‖xi − xj‖2),
where γ is another parameter to be determined in our SVM classification, and
xi, xj are corresponding feature values of the i
th and the jth samples, respectively.
The RBF kernel is a reasonably good choice for the kernel function, in that the
linear kernel is a special case of the RBF, and the sigmoid kernel behaves like the
RBF for certain parameters. Comparing with the polynomial and sigmoid kernels,
which involves two or three parameters to be determined, the RBF kernel also
eases the parameter tuning.
In practical use of SVM classification, it is also found that certain pre-processing
on feature values before applying the SVM classifier can increase classification ac-
curacy [44]. One pre-processing example is linearly scaling values associated with
individual features [44] to the range of [−1, 1] or [0, 1]. When using the proposed
noise features to classify scanner models, we found that taking a log2(·) operation
on the feature values for f (3)(I), f (4)(I) from wavelet analysis and f (5)(I), f (6)(I)
from neighborhood prediction can help increase the accuracy of scanner classifica-
tion.
To determine the two parameters ν and γ in the above SVM classification,
we perform a grid search on the (γ, ν) pair using v-fold cross validation, as rec-
ommended in [44]. In the v-fold cross validation, all the training samples are
divided into v subsets in a random way. Each of these v subsets is tested using
the classifier build upon the remaining v − 1 subsets. In this way, every train-
ing sample is tested once and only once, and the cross-validation accuracy is the
percentage of samples that are correctly classified. In our experiments, for each

































Figure 5.8: Cross-validation results for determining the parameters of SVM clas-
sification.
of {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, · · · , 0.35, 0.4}, we perform 5-fold cross validation, and finally
choose the (γ, ν) pair with the highest cross-validation accuracy. In Fig. 5.8, we
show an example of the cross-validation results in determining the two parameters
of γ and ν.
5.4.2 Results on Scanner Model Identification
In our test with scanner model identification, we collect six scanner sets from five
scanner models, as shown in Table 5.2, among which the last two scanners are of
the same model. To generate scanned images, we print out 96 digital photographs
of different content on 5” × 7” glossy photo paper, and then scan each of them
back to be a digital image using each of the seven scanners listed in Table 5.2.
The same scanning resolution of 150dpi is used for all the scanners. In this way,
we build a scanned image database consisting of 96× 6 = 576 images, upon which
we examine the performance of scanner model identification using the proposed
statistical noise features.
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Table 5.2: A list of scanner models in the experiments.
ID Scanner and its model Resolution
1 Canon CanoScan D1250U2F 1200 × 2400 dpi
2 Epson Perfection 2450 photo 2400 × 4800 dpi
3 Microtek ScanMaker 3600 600 × 1200 dpi
4 Visioneer OneTouch 5800USB 600 × 1200 dpi
5 CanonScan LiDE70 Set 1 2400 × 4800 dpi
6 CanonScan LiDE70 Set 2 2400 × 4800 dpi
Taking the 60 noise features with parameters (γ, ν) determined as above in
Section 5.4.1, we train the SVM with q samples randomly chosen out of the total
of n images for each class, and test it with the remaining n − q images. The
identification performance is then measured in terms of the confusion matrix C,
where the element Ci,j represents the percentage of images from class i identified
as from class j. The average of the diagonal elements Ci,i represent the overall
classification accuracy. In our experiments, we repeat the above SVM training-
testing process 200 times, each time with a different selection of the q training
images. Confusion matrices obtained from all the 200 iterations are averaged to
arrive at the confusion matrix reported below.
Statistical Noise Features Associated with Scanner Model: In this test,
we examine if the statistical noise features are indeed associated with the scanner
model and how they perform in terms of identifying the scanner model. First,
we take the six scanner sets as the six classes to be identified. Using q = 48
images for training and the remaining n − q = 96 − 48 = 48 images for testing,
we obtain a confusion matrix as shown in Table 5.3. We can see that a non-
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trivial amount of confusion exists only between the last two scanners coming from
the same model, and all the other scanners of different models can be accurately
identified. To further demonstrate that the proposed statistical noise features are
indeed associated with the scanner model but not with individual scanner sets,
we take the five scanner models as the five classes, and perform the following two
training-testing tasks. The first one uses the same scanner set “CanonScan LiDE 70
Set 1” for both the training and the testing, while the second one uses “CanonScan
LiDE 70 Set 2” for the training but “CanonScan LiDE 70 Set 1” for the testing.
In Table 5.4(a) and (b), we show the confusion matrices for the above two tests,
respectively, with half of the images for the training and the remaining half for
the testing as before. We can see that both cases are able to identify the correct
scanner models with very high accuracy of above 98%. Similar results are obtained
when images from “CanonScan LiDE 70 Set 1” are used for the training, but those
from “CanonScan LiDE 70 Set 2” for the testing, as shown in Table 5.4(c) for the
confusion matrix. The above tests demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
scheme in scanner model identification. In Table 5.4(d), we show the confusion
matrix of the 5-scanner model identification with each of the 96 scanned image
samples for the “CanonScan LiDE 70” model randomly chosen from its 2 scanner
sets with an equal probability.
Scanner Model Identification with Robustness against Post-Processing:
In the following, we examine robustness of the scanner model identification against
various post-processing operations on scanned images. We take the five scanner
models as the five classes to be identified, and use half of the images for training and
the remaining half for testing. When multiple (m > 1) scanner sets are available
for a single scanner model, each of the n scanned image samples for this model
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Table 5.3: Confusion matrix with 48 training images in a total of 96 images for the
proposed scheme, with the six scanners listed in TABLE 5.2 as the six classes.
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 98% 0 1% 1% 0 0
2 0 99% 0 0 1% 0
3 1% 0 99% 0 0 0
4 1% 0 0 99% 0 0
5 0 1% 0 0 85% 14%
6 0 0 0 0 17% 83%
will be randomly chosen from the m scanner sets with an equal probability of 1
m
.
First, we examine how the size of scanned images affects the accuracy of scanner
model identification. In order to do so, we divide each of the scanned images of size






, respectively, and then use these
image blocks as scanned image samples for identifying the scanner models. For the
above two image partition cases, we now have n = 96×2 = 192 (n = 96×4 = 384)
scanned image samples for each of the five scanner models, and we obtain confusion
matrices as shown in Table 5.5(a)((b)) with an overall classification accuracy of
99% (98%). Further we collect image blocks of different sizes to form the n samples
for each of the five scanner models. Specifically, for the 96 scanned images directly
output from each scanner, we randomly divide them into three groups, with 32
images for each group. Images in the second and third group are divided into






, respectively, which are then combined
with the images in the first group to form a total of n = 32+32×2+32×4 = 224
image samples for each scanner. Using these 224 image samples for scanner model
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Table 5.4: Confusion matrix with 48 training images in a total of 96 images for the
proposed scheme, with the five scanner models listed in TABLE 5.2 as the five classes:
(a) the same scanner “CanonScan LiDE70 Set 1” used for both training and testing, (b)
“CanonScan LiDE70 Set 2” used for training but “CanonScan LiDE70 Set 1” used for
testing, (c) “CanonScan LiDE70 Set 1” used for training but “CanonScan LiDE70 Set
2” used for testing, (d) Each scanned image sample for the “CanonScan LiDE70” model
is randomly chosen from its 2 sets with an equal probability.
(a) (b)
ID 1 2 3 4 5
1 99% 0 1% 0 0
2 0 99% 0 0 1%
3 1% 1% 98% 0 0
4 1% 1% 0 98% 0
5 0 1% 0 0 99%
ID 1 2 3 4 6
1 98% 0 1% 1% 0
2 0 99% 0 0 1%
3 1% 1% 98% 0 0
4 1% 0 0 98% 1%
5 0 2% 0 0 98%
(c) (d)
ID 1 2 3 4 5
1 98% 0 1% 1% 0
2 0 99% 0 0 1%
3 1% 1% 98% 0 0
4 1% 1% 0 98% 0
6 0 1% 0 0 99%
ID 1 2 3 4 5/6
1 98% 0 1% 1% 0
2 0 99% 0 0 1%
3 1% 0 99% 0 0
4 0 1% 0 98% 1%
5/6 0 1% 0 0 99%
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identification, we obtain a confusion matrix as shown in Table 5.5(c) with an overall
classification accuracy of 98%. From the above results, we can see that scanner
models can be accurately identified even though the scanned images are in different
sizes. To evaluate the impact of image content in identifying scanner models, we
carry out the following test. We randomly partition the 96 × 4 = 384 scanned




into six sets, with 64 blocks for each set. We then use
the 64 image blocks in set 1, 2, · · · , 5 as the training samples for scanner model
1, 2, · · · , 5, respectively. Performing testing with image blocks in the last set for all
of the five scanner models, we obtain a confusion matrix as shown in Table 5.5(d)
with an overall classification accuracy of 97%. This demonstrates that our scheme
does not require different scanner models capture the same images for building the
scanner model identifier.
Second, we examine the performance of scanner model identification with scanned
images having gone through various post-processing operations. In Table 5.6, we
list the post-processing operations as well as the overall classification accuracy
corresponding to each of them. The results here are obtained under an informed
experiment, with half of the scanned images after a certain post-processing oper-
ation for the training, and the remaining half after the same post-processing op-
eration for the testing. Under many post-processing operations, such as additive
noise, rotation, gamma correction, sharpening, contrast enhancement, scaling and
JPEG compression with a factor large enough, the proposed statistical noise fea-
tures are still capable of identifying the scanner models with high accuracy. Under
strong average and median filtering, scaling with a very small factor, and JPEG
compression with a low quality factor, the scanning noise is severely smoothed
out, resulting in the performance drop on scanner model identification. Among
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Table 5.5: Confusion matrix with half of the available image blocks of certain sizes
for training and the remaining half for testing using the proposed scheme, with the five
scanner models listed in TABLE 5.2 as the five classes, and using (a) image blocks of
size M × N2 , (b)image blocks of size M2 × N2 , (c)image blocks of the three different sizes
M × N , M × N2 , and M2 × N2 , and (d) image blocks of different content for training
different scanner models.
(a) (b)
ID 1 2 3 4 5
1 98% 0 2% 0 0
2 1% 99% 0 0 0
3 1% 0 99% 0 0
4 1% 0 1% 98% 0
5 0 1% 0 0 99%
ID 1 2 3 4 6
1 98% 0 2% 0 0
2 1% 98% 0 0 1%
3 0 1% 99% 0 0
4 1% 0 0 99% 0
5 0 2% 0 0 98%
(c) (d)
ID 1 2 3 4 5
1 98% 0 1% 1% 0
2 0 99% 0 0 1%
3 1% 1% 98% 0 0
4 1% 1% 0 98% 0
6 0 1% 0 0 99%
ID 1 2 3 4 5/6
1 98% 0 2% 0 0
2 0 97% 1% 0 2%
3 1% 1% 98% 0 0
4 1% 0 0 98% 1%
5/6 0 3% 0 1% 96%
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the six post-processing categories with an identification accuracy higher than 95%,
{additive noise with a Signal to Noise Ration of 5dB, rotation of 5 degrees, resizing
with a scaling factor of 1.25, gamma correction with γ = 1.25, sharpening with the
filter parameter equaling to 0.2, and contrast enhancement}, we further perform
the following non-informed experiment. Each of the n = 96 image samples for each
scanner model is now randomly chosen from its six post-processed versions as above
with an equal probability of 1
6
. Still using half of the 96 selected image samples for
the training and the remaining half for the testing, we obtain a confusion matrix
as shown in Table 5.7 for the scanner model identification. For this challenging
task of non-informed scanner identification, the proposed scheme still achieves a
high overall classification accuracy of 90%, demonstrating the robustness of our
scanner model identifier.
5.4.3 Identifying Image Acquisition Apparatus
Besides identifying the model of the scanner used to capture individual scanned
images, some forensic scenario may require scanned images be differentiated from
camera taken images and computer generated images. Considering that images
produced by digital cameras or computer programs contain noise of different amounts
and properties from scanned images, here we evaluate how the proposed statistical
noise features would help on broadening the scope of acquisition forensics to multi-
ple kinds of image acquisition apparatus: scanner, camera, or computer program.
In carrying out the evaluation, we randomly select each of the 96 scanned im-
ages from the five scanner models we have with an equal probability. Similarly, we
select 96 digital images taken by five different camera models, Canon G6, Olym-
pusC3100Z, Canon Powershot S400, Minolta DiMAGE F100, and Nikon E4300, as
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Table 5.6: Overall classification accuracy of scanner model identification after post-
processing operations on scanned images.
Average filtering Median filtering Additive noise 
Order size Order size SNR (dB) 
Post-processing 
with parameters 
3 5 7 3 5 7 5 10 
Classification 
accuracy 89% 85% 79% 88% 81% 76% 98% 99% 
Rotation Resizing 
Angle Scaling factor 
Post-processing 
with parameters 
1 5 10 20 0.5 0.75 1.25 1.5 
Classification 
accuracy 96% 96% 96% 94% 87% 94% 97% 97% 




100 95 90 75 0.5 0.75 1.25 1.5 
Classification 
accuracy 93% 86% 77% 59% 98% 98% 97% 97% 
Sharpening
Unsharp filter parameter 
Post-processing 
with parameters 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
Contrast enhancement 
Classification 
accuracy 98% 98% 98% 98% 96% 
Table 5.7: Confusion matrix with 48 training images in a total of 96 images for the
proposed scheme, with the five scanner models listed in TABLE 5.2 as the five classes,
and each of the 96 image samples is randomly chosen from six of its post-processed
versions.
ID 1 2 3 4 5/6
1 93% 2% 2% 2% 1%
2 4% 87% 3% 0 6%
3 2% 3% 91% 3% 1%
4 5% 3% 2% 89% 1%
5/6 2% 8% 0 0 90%
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well as 96 computer generated images provided by [68]. We then calculate the 60
statistical noise features for each of these images, and use the SVM to differentiate
scanned images from 1) camera taken images and 2) computer generated images.
For each of the above two identification tasks, we randomly choose half of the im-
ages from each category for training, and test on the remaining images. Computing
the fraction of correctly identified scanned images Pd, and the percentage of non-
scanned images wrongly classified as scanned images Pf , we obtain the receiver
operating characteristics (ROC). In Fig 5.9, we show the ROCs averaged over 200
iterations for identifying scanned images from the other two kinds of image acqui-
sition apparatus, each time with a different selection of the 48 training images. We
observe from the figure that the identification performance is very good, with the
Pd around 90% (94%) under a very low Pf of 1% for differentiating scanned images
from camera taken images (computer generated images). This suggests that the
proposed statistical noise features are capable of identifying scanned images from





















Figure 5.9: Receiver Operating Characteristics for identifying scanned images from
camera taken images and computer generated images.
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5.4.4 Integrity Forensic Analysis on Scanned Images
When scanned images directly output from scanners are modified to carry stego
information or go through certain post-processing operations, such as low-pass
filtering, scaling, and rotation as possibly involved in tampering a scanned image,
with a high probability the intrinsic statistical noise features of the original scanned
images shall be altered. In the following, we examine how the proposed scheme
performs in such integrity forensic analysis on scanned images as detecting post-
processing after scanning and performing steganalysis on scanned images.
Results for Identifying Post-processing after Scanning: In the test of
post-processing identification, each scanned image directly output from a scanner
is processed to generate 29 manipulated versions by using the 29 post-processing
operations listed in Table 5.6. First, we take the 96 scanned images from a single
scanner model, CanonScan D1250U2F, as the original unprocessed scanned images,
and calculate the 60 noise features for each of them. For each of the nine types
of post-processing operations listed in Table 5.6, we randomly choose the 96 post-
processed images from the operations listed in Table 5.6 for each type, and then
feed them into the SVM to classify the original scanned images from the post-
processed scanned images. Similar to the above image acquisition analysis, we
randomly choose 48 original images along with their corresponding post-processed
versions for training, and test on the remaining images to obtain the ROC which
indicates the relationship between the probability of detecting post-processing Pd
and the probability of false alarm Pf . Fig. 5.10(a) shows the ROC averaged over
200 iterations for each of the nine types of post-processing, each time with a
different selection of the 48 training images. Similarly, Fig. 5.10(b) reports the
ROC curves when the 96 original scanned images and their corresponding post-
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processed versions are randomly chosen from all the five scanner models. We
observe from both figures that the identification performance is very good for most
post-processing manipulations, especially when scanned images are coming from a
single scanner model. This indicates that the proposed noise features can capture
the changes from a direct scanner output to its further manipulated versions, and


































































Figure 5.10: Receiver Operating Characteristics for identifying nine types of post-
processing operations: (a) scanned images are from a single scanner model; (b)
scanned images are from multiple scanner models.
Results for Steganalysis on Scanned Images: In the steganalysis test, we use
96 scanned images directly output from a single scanner model or from multiple
scanner models as the cover images, similar to the way of choosing the unprocessed
images in the test of post-processing detection. From each cover image, a number
of stego images are generated by embedding random messages of different sizes. In
a general scenario, the maximum embedding payload depends on the nature of the
cover data and the steganographic embedding method. In our test, we first find the
average of the maximum embedding payload across the 96 cover images and then
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embed messages at 100%, 75%, 50%, and 25% of this value. In our current studies,
we consider two popular types of least significant bit (LSB) based steganographic
algorithms, namely, F5 [86], and hide4pgp [4].
In the case of F5, the maximum embedding payload averaged over our 96 cover
images is around 12 KB. Corresponding to the percentages of 100%, 75%, 50%,
and 25%, messages of sizes 12 KB, 9 KB, 6 KB, and 3 KB are embedded into
each of the 96 cover images to generate 4 × 96 = 384 stego images in total. For
each of the four message sizes, we perform SVM training and testing as in the
post-processing detection test, and obtain ROC curves as shown in Fig. 5.11(a)
when the 96 cover images come from a single scanner model and in Fig. 5.11(b)
when they are from multiple scanner models. We can see that the performance
in discriminating the cover and stego images is extremely good, no matter the
cover images are from a single scanner model or from multiple models. Further,
we notice that the discrimination performance is independent of the embedding
rate, suggesting that the proposed noise features can perform accurate steganalysis
on F5 even under low embedding payloads. Similarly, we show the results for the
hide4pgp algorithm in Fig. 5.12 (a) and (b) for the single scanner model case and
for the multiple scanner model case, respectively. The maximal embedding payload
of the hide4pgp algorithm averaged over the 96 cover images is 192 KB, and we
show the ROC curves under 100%, 75%, 50%, and 25% of this maximal average
embedding payload. In performing steganalysis for the hide4pgp algorithm, we
observe that the steganalysis performance improves as the embedded message size
















































Figure 5.11: Receiver Operating Characteristics for steganalysis on the F5 embed-
ding algorithm: (a) scanned images are from a single scanner model; (b) scanned














































Figure 5.12: Receiver Operating Characteristics for steganalysis on the hide4pgp
embedding algorithm: (a) scanned images are from a single scanner model; (b)
scanned images are from multiple scanner models.
150
5.4.5 Comparisons with Related Prior Art
As pointed out in Section 5.1, classifier based approaches are also used in some
prior work for tampering detection [5, 23] and blind steganalysis [6, 24] on digital
images. In this subsection, we examine how the features in these two works perform
in terms of scanner model identification. For the purpose of comparison, we will
also report the performance of using the features in [23, 24] for identifying image
acquisition apparatus, for detecting post-processing operations after scanning, and
for performing steganalysis on scanned images.
In our experiments, for each of the 96×5 = 480 scanned images in our database
from the five scanner models, we calculate 216 high-order wavelet statistic features
in [23] and 45 image quality metric features in [6], respectively. Then, we borrow
each of these two groups of features for scanner model classification, via sequentially
applying the PCA and SVM as used before. In Table 5.8(a), for using these wavelet
statistic features, we show the confusion matrix averaged over 200 iterations with
50% of the scanned images in the training set and the remaining 50% in the
testing set, and we notice that the overall classification accuracy is around 81%.
Similarly, for using image quality metric features in [6], we obtain a confusion
matrix under the half-half scenario as shown in Table 5.8(b), which gives us an
overall classification accuracy of 79%. From the results here, we can see that both
values for the overall classification accuracy, 81% and 79%, are much smaller than
the accuracy of 98% achieved by using our statistical noise features in the same
half-half scenario.
In the following, we present the results of using the features in [23] for differenti-
ating scanned images from camera taken images and computer generated images,
as well as for detecting post-processing operations after scanning and perform-
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Table 5.8: Confusion matrix with 48 training images in a total of 96 images for borrowing
features from prior works to identify the five scanner models listed in TABLE 5.2, and
each scanned image sample for the “CanonScan LiDE70” model is randomly chosen
from its 2 sets with an equal probability: (a) Farid-Lyu’s scheme [23], (b)Avcibas et al.’s
scheme [6].
(a) (b)
ID 1 2 3 4 5/6
1 86% 1% 9% 4% 0
2 0 81% 2% 0 17%
3 13% 2% 78% 5% 2%
4 6% 2% 4% 88% 0
5/6 3% 21% 2% 0 74%
ID 1 2 3 4 5/6
1 84% 10% 4% 2% 0
2 9% 76% 4% 2% 9%
3 5% 4% 76% 14% 1%
4 6% 4% 14% 75% 1%
5/6 2% 13% 2% 1% 82%
ing steganalysis on scanned images. Using the 216 high-order wavelet statistic
features in [23], we obtain ROC curves as shown in Fig. 5.13 for differentiating
scanned images from camera taken image and computer generated images. In
Fig. 5.14 and Fig. 5.15, we show the ROC curves for post-processing identification
and steganalysis on scanned images, respectively. Comparing results here with
the results obtained in Section 5.4.3∼5.4.4 by using the proposed statistical noise
features, we can see that the proposed scheme has comparable performance with
or outperforms the prior art for most identification tasks involved in differentiating
scanned images from camera taken images and computer generated images, as well
as in post-processing detection and steganalysis on scanned images. Throughout
the comparisons in this subsection, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed
scheme in addressing forensic analysis problems related to scanned images. This
is because our statistic noise features represent unique characteristics of scanners
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Figure 5.13: Receiver Operating Characteristics of Farid-Lyu’s scheme [23] for
differentiating scanned images from camera taken images and computer generate
images.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel approach to identifying the source and
integrity of scanned images, based on extracting statistical features of scanning
noise from scanned image samples. We characterize scanning noise from multiple
perspectives, and then obtain statistical noise features from each characterization.
Applying image denoising algorithms, we obtain estimates of the scanning noise,
and then extract the first set of features from them. We observe that scanning noise
affects the non-Gaussian property of wavelet subband coefficients, and therefore
leverage it to extract the second set of features. We also perform neighborhood pre-
diction and utilize the prediction error for extracting the third set of scanning noise



































































Figure 5.14: Receiver Operating Characteristics of Farid-Lyu’s scheme [23] for
post-processing identification: (a) scanned images are from a single scanner model;
(b) scanned images are from multiple scanner models.
that can determine the scanner model used to capture individual scanned images
with high accuracy and strong resilience to a number of post-processing operations
on scanned images. We also examine the the performance of using the proposed
statistical noise features to differentiate scanned images from camera taken images
and computer generated images, as well as to detect post-processing operations
and to perform steganalysis on scanned images. The proposed technique provides
a new way to establishing the trust-worthiness of scanners and scanned images,
and foster secure exchange of scanned documents with widespread applications in
the modern information era.
5.6 Appendix: Solving Nonnegative Least Squares
The non-negative least-squares (NNLS) problem is defined by
min
x




























































































Figure 5.15: Receiver Operating Characteristics of Farid-Lyu’s scheme [23] for Ste-
ganalysis on scanned images: (a) F5 embedding algorithm with scanned images
from a single scanner model; (b) F5 embedding algorithm with scanned images
from multiple scanner models; (c) hide4pgp embedding algorithm with scanned im-
ages from a single scanner model; (d) hide4pgp embedding algorithm with scanned
images from multiple scanner models.
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where A is of size N × n, x of size n × 1, and b of size N × 1. To find the non-
negative weight coefficients x, we define an n × 1 dual vector w = AT (b − Ax),
and further obtain a partition of the set of {1, 2, . . . , n} into two index subsets P
and Z so that
xj > 0 for j ∈ P, xj = 0 for j ∈ Z
wj = 0 for j ∈ P, wj ≤ 0 for j ∈ Z
(5.13)
Equations in (5.13) constitute the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT) conditions charac-
terizing a solution vector x for the NNLS problem, and can be established using
the NNLS algorithm [54]. This algorithm starts with P = Φ, Z = {1, 2, . . . , n},
and x = 0. Then, it iteratively modifies the set partition as well as the value of
x in the course of executing the algorithm. Each time an index t will be moved
from the set Z to the set P, according to the maximal value in the dual vector
w: wt = max{wj, j ∈ Z} ∧ wt > 0. Variables with indices in the set Z will be
held at the value 0, while variables with indices in the set P will take values deter-
mined by solving a least squares problem. If a variable indexed in the set P takes
a non-positive value, the algorithm will either make the variable take a positive
value, or set the variable to 0 and move its index from the set P to the set Z. The
algorithm terminates when either the set Z becomes empty or there is no positive




In this dissertation, we have investigated two complementary mechanisms for per-
forming forensic analysis on various graphic data to facilitate their proper distri-
bution and usage. In the area of constructing forensic systems via extrinsic data
embedding, we have developed robust digital fingerprinting for curve-based graph-
ics as well as 3-D digital elevation maps(DEMs) for tracing traitors. We have also
investigated high-payload watermark embedding for binary images to facilitate au-
thentication of such graphic data as critical document and signature images. In the
area of constructing forensic systems via intrinsic sensor features, we have studied
sensor noise features of scanners for non-intrusive scanner forensics on verifying
the source and integrity of digital scanned images.
In Chapter 2, we have proposed a robust data embedding method for curves and
investigates its feasibility for digital fingerprinting of such curve-based graphic data
as topographic maps and writhings/drawings for traitor tracing. In our method, we
have parameterized a curve using the B-spline model and then added spread spec-
trum sequences to B-spline parameters. In conjunction with the basic embedding
and detection techniques, we have proposed an iterative alignment-minimization
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algorithm to allow for robust fingerprint detection under unknown geometric trans-
formations and in the absence of explicit point correspondence. We have demon-
strated the proposed method can achieve high-fidelity curve embedding as well as
effective fingerprint detection with strong robustness against a number of challeng-
ing attacks.
In Chapter 3, we have extended the curve-based data embedding in Chapter 2
to fingerprinting digital elevation maps for the same purpose of tracing traitors.
We have developed the framework and algorithms for cross-dimensional DEM fin-
gerprinting via hiding data in a DEM’s 2-D contour curves. Using the proposed
method, digital fingerprints can be reliably detected from both a 3-D DEM and its
2-D rendering, whichever format available to a detector. In this chapter, we have
also examined the tradeoff between fidelity of fingerprinted DEMs and robustness
of fingerprints, with several fine-tuning techniques to adjust the tradeoff.
In Chapter 4, we have studied high-payload and high-fidelity data embedding
in binary images, and shown its feasibility for binary image authentication. Our
work has incorporated a recent steganography framework known as wet paper cod-
ing, which can naturally handle the uneven embedding capacity in a binary image
through randomized projections. By jointly considering the embedding of multi-
ple bits, the wet paper coding also allows for a high utilization of flippable pixels
available, thus providing a high embedding payload for binary images. With this
potential in embedding a large payload, it is important to preserve the perceptual
quality of watermarked binary images. To achieve this purpose, we have developed
an adaptive trimming method to perform flippability assignment on individual pix-
els as well as a new concept of super-pixels for addressing flippability dependencies
of a group of pixels.
158
In Chapter 5, we have focused on non-intrusive forensic analysis on scanners
and scanned images via detecting intrinsic sensor noise features, and demonstrated
various forensic applications in identifying the source and integrity of scanned im-
ages. By using only scanned image samples, we have characterized scanning noise
from multiple perspectives, including through image de-noising, wavelet analysis,
and neighborhood prediction, and then obtained statistical noise features from each
characterization. Building upon these intrinsic noise features, we have constructed
a robust scanner identifier that can determine the scanner model used to capture
individual scanned images with high accuracy and strong resilience to a number of
post-processing operations on scanned images. Using these noise features, we have
further broadened the scope of acquisition forensics to differentiating scanned im-
ages from camera taken images and computer generated images, as well as enabled
such integrity forensic analysis as detecting post-processing and stegonagraphy
operations on scanned images.
Throughout this dissertation, we have shown that when developing forensic
analysis systems for graphic data, it is important to identify characteristics unique
to each type of graphic data, and then to develop extrinsic data embedding al-
gorithms and/or intrinsic sensor features in a way of tailoring to these unique
characteristics. In the following, we point out possible extensions of this disserta-
tion that can be pursued further.
In the extrinsic data embedding area, first, our B-spline based curve finger-
printing method may be extended to fingerprinting 3-D computer graphics, where
B-spline curves and surfaces are commonly employed in their vectorized surface
representations. In a discrete digital setting, 3-D computer graphics are created
through digitally synthesizing and manipulating various geometric shapes and ob-
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jects. Considering design complexity and efforts in creating 3-D computer graphics
as well as their commercial values, it is desirable to embed digital fingerprints into
3-D computer graphics at the time of their creation. Based on the fact that 3-D
computer graphics are directly generated in the digital domain and possibly with
B-spline parameterization, it is both efficient and feasible to apply B-spline based
digital fingerprinting to 3-D computer graphics. Second, wet paper codes can be
employed and modified correspondingly to enhance the performance of hiding data
in some specific binary images such as halftone images. In the wet paper codes,
the pseudo-random matrix D plays an important role, with its elements being able
to have certain structure or follow some probability distribution. Meanwhile, for
a specific kind of binary image, there may exist a clever way to choose flippable
pixels. Jointly considering the above two aspects, the design of the D matrix and
the selection of flippables, is expected to arrive at an improved data embedding
system for those specific binary images.
In the area of detecting intrinsic sensor features, performing non-intrusive foren-
sic analysis on various computer generated graphics can be an interesting perspec-
tive to explore. In the entertainment industry, a device known as 3-D scanners1
has been extensively used to create 3-D graphics for both movies and video games.
Instead of collecting color information as in cameras and scanners, 3-D scanners
collect distance information about surfaces within its field of view. Such distance
information from multiple scans and different directions can then be used to con-
struct 3-D models for creating computer graphics. Several types of 3-D scanners
have been developed with a variety of technologies. When there does not exist
a real-world equivalent of the desired model, certain 3-D modelling software is
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3D scanner
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needed to construct 3-D models. Additionally, various algorithms are employed
in generating computer graphics after obtaining the models. There are also many
software programs for manipulating computer graphics. Given computer gener-
ated graphics in movies, video games, or as digital art2, it would be interesting
to know which hardware devices and software algorithms have been employed to
acquire/manipulate them, and non-intrusive forensic analysis using intrinsic hard-
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